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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
 Free speech is a right that underpins all other rights in Western political thought. 
According to the American Civil Liberties Union, “Freedom of speech, of the press, of 
association, of assembly and petition -- this set of guarantees, protected by the First Amendment, 
comprises what we refer to as freedom of expression. The Supreme Court has written that this 
freedom is ‘the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom.’ 
Without it, other fundamental rights, like the right to vote, would wither and die” (“Free 
Speech”). Free speech is a matrix, the cohesion that holds all other laws and rights together, the 
proverbial glue of Western society. As an important hallmark of the Western political thought, 
freedom of speech is arguably one of the most important aspects of Western governance. 
Governance in political terminology can have a diversity of potential meanings. In the context of 
freedom of speech and governance, the definition provided Hyden best explains this relationship, 
as he defines governance as “the conscious management of regime structures, with a view to 
enhancing the public realm” (Hyden, 7). Part of managing regime structure and the public realm 
in governance is managing positive and negative rights. Positive rights are rights that a 
government is expected to provide for a population, such as access to safe food, shelter, and 
safety. Negative rights, like freedom of speech, are rights which governments are not supposed 
to infringe upon. Actively handling these rights, especially freedom of speech, is an important 
component of enhancing the public realm, especially in maintaining stability in a society. 
 Beyond the countries known as “the West,” governments also grapple with freedom of 
speech as a governance issue. In China, for example, the concept of freedom of speech is a 
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contentious issue. Few laws in China protect freedom of speech for civilians, and these few laws 
are frequently overlooked by Chinese government officials. In theory, the Chinese Constitution 
asserts that Chinese citizens have freedom of speech, can speak their minds freely, and are 
permitted to criticize the government. Under Chapter II: the Fundamental Rights and Duties of 
Citizens, Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution states that “Citizens of the People's Republic of 
China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of 
demonstration” (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China). In practice, the Chinese 
propaganda regime and massive Internet surveillance system heavily restrict free speech. The 
West criticizes China for this hypocrisy frequently, often with some degree of moral superiority. 
Freedom of speech is a politically complex subject for governance. When ruling a nation, 
governments seeking to maintain sovereignty risk a great deal by allowing citizens to dissent, to 
voice their opinions. Revolutions begin, coup d’états occur, and politicians lose their control of 
the government if dissent grows beyond the breaking point. However, silencing speech in some 
situations can create even more instability than allowing dissent to occur. Restricting freedom of 
speech risks the citizens fomenting dissent privately. This inherent struggle of when to allow 
speech and when to silence it is at the crux of governing freedom of speech. It may be surprising 
for some to hear that “freedom of speech” is governed. After all, in the West, free speech is 
conceptualized as the absence of government in our speech, the permission to say essentially 
what is on our minds, unfettered by government control. Yet, in Europe, America, and China, 
there are legacies of political theory which dictate how and why governments allow freedom of 
speech, under what situations speech is and is not permissible.  
China, the United States, and the European Union share one fundamental governance 
concept on freedom of speech: all three control freedom of speech when the motivations for 
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restricting it protect the governments’ long-term interests. In other words, freedom of speech 
does different governance work for different regimes. Contrary to our conventional notions of 
freedom of speech as simply an index for citizen liberties, where more freedom of speech 
equates to more power for citizens in the governance process, this thesis highlights the different 
ways in which freedom of speech is a political tool of power for governments, where freedom of 
expression enables government control of the population. There is a conception that the more 
freedom of speech a country has, the more free the people are; that is not the case. By taking 
three very different regime types with three different approaches to freedom of speech, it is 
possible to examine this complex relationship between freedom of speech and governance. 
 Readers in the West may contest the allegation that Western governments control 
freedom of speech. While the US and the EU do not implement the same governance model for 
controlling speech as the Chinese government does, these Western governments do control 
freedom of speech, albeit using different methods. The Chinese government controls freedom of 
speech by silencing dissent when the speech calls into question the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s central initiatives relating to economic progress. The US and the EU have 
similar control tactics that are more complex than simply silencing dissent; after all, in the West, 
citizens will not tolerate such governance methods. Instead, the EU and US governments control 
freedom of speech by manipulating the discourse surrounding important government initiatives 
such that citizens can protest incessantly, but the legislation or initiative will still pass into law. 
The EU and the US share two common governance tactics for controlling the discourse, and thus 
controlling free speech. First, in the Internet age, governments use social media to both collect 
public opinion and to disseminate the government’s discourse on a given issue. Second, if the 
government fails to convince the population of an initiative’s merits, there are governance tactics, 
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like seeking judicial oversight or redrafting legislation to conceal the original initiative, which 
allow the government to achieve its original goal. 
Freedom of speech is a right guaranteed by the US, the EU, and China; however, just 
because a right is guaranteed does not mean the government cannot manipulate the right to 
achieve its ends. Freedom of speech is commonly associated with the power of language; 
citizens speak in order to take control of those governing them, in order to assert their desires. In 
reality, freedom of speech is far more beneficial for governments, who can use this dissent to 
better control a population. In order to control the population, though, the governments must first 
control the dissenting speech, the discourse, surrounding an issue. In the case studies that follow, 
these three governments with very different regimes will manipulate discourses elicited in the 
name of free speech in order to advance the governments’ plans, even when these plans went 
against the stated public interest and ignored the dissenting citizens. This thesis, in essence, 
examines how freedom of speech can become a tool of power for regimes. 
The West: Freedom of Speech as Power for Regimes 
 There is a notion in Western political theory that free speech is a means for the people to 
monitor and protest against the government, hence the phraseology of “freedom of speech.” 
Theorists like John Stuart Mill and John Locke were the first great proponents of individual 
freedoms. Locke’s main contribution to the notion of freedom of speech was his development of 
the notion that individuals have rights. Locke established the individual as an actor in his Second 
Treatise of Government. From here, he builds his theory of the individual’s right to “life, liberty, 
property, and the pursuit of happiness.”  
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Building on Locke’s notion of individual rights, Mill is one of the first major defendants 
of freedom of speech. He observes that allowing freedom of speech allows for the citizen to 
choose freely between ideas, to be more fully informed. 
 “I choose, by preference the cases which are least favourable to me – In 
which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on truth and that of utility, is 
considered the strongest. Let the opinions impugned be the belief of God and in a 
future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality... But I must 
be permitted to observe that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it 
may) which I call an assumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking to decide 
that question for others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the 
contrary side.” 
 
 Mill argues that freedom of speech is a critical component to facilitate societal 
interactions and to have meaningful discussion, both underpinnings of liberal democracy and 
general civil society. Essentially, Mill argues that truth destroys falsity; therefore, all speech goes 
towards finding truth by reconciling the perspectives of multiple actors. As such, it is clearly to 
the benefit of society to have uninhibited speech, as this method will destroy false claims faster 
than a society with censorship that perpetuates false notions. 
 However, even Mill cannot accept unlimited free speech.  Mill adds the first limitation to 
free speech in the same work that creates the concept. In On Liberty, Mill sets the standard of 
freedom of speech as anything that can and should be said, no matter how insulting or 
controversial, he says: "there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a 
matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered." The only 
time this sort of language can be hindered is if it violates what Mill terms “the harm principle”, 
which is that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." In essence, according to 
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Mill and subsequent scholarship, this principle means physical harm is grounds for limiting free 
speech. 
In 1985, Joel Feinberg added to the Millian notion of the harm principle with the offense 
principle. Feinberg argues that the harm principle does not provide enough protection for the 
behavior of others that could cause psychological harm to surrounding citizens. His contribution 
to help complete the harm principle, the offense principle, states that, “It is always a good reason 
in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of 
preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that 
it is probably a necessary means to that end” (Feinberg). Feinberg takes the term “offense” to 
mean “the subjective element” that “consists in the experience of an unpleasant mental state (for 
example, shame, disgust, anxiety, embarrassment); the objective element consists in the 
existence of a wrongful cause of such a mental state” (“Law, Philosophy”). From these basics of 
freedom of speech, the harm and offense principles, Western liberal democracy has built what is 
known as “freedom of speech.” In essence, speech is only limited when it is harmful to others. 
However, harmful can become problematic to define. The First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution reads “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.” Not included in the wording of the First Amendment are the exceptions to the First 
Amendment, types of speech that qualify as harmful, which include hate speech, obscenity, 
pornography, and other forms of speech that could be deemed harmful to individuals.  
10 
 
The trouble with these limitations on free speech is that the government can take these 
limitations to restrict individuals from commenting on or protesting against the government. 
Several acts of Congress have made acting against the US government’s interest illegal, despite 
the protections provided to citizens by the First Amendment. The Espionage Act of 1917 
imposed a twenty year sentence on anyone who exhibited "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, 
or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States ("People & Events: Prelude 
to the Red Scare”). The Sedition Act of 1918 made "disloyal," "scurrilous" or "abusive" language 
against the government illegal ("People & Events: Prelude to the Red Scare”). None of these acts 
directly involved the safety of one individual; rather, the logic behind these laws is that the 
collective safety of the public was in jeopardy, which brings the relevant question: how far can 
the government take this claim towards public safety as a means of hindering free speech? And 
what does this issue tell us about why a government allows free speech at all?  
China and Freedom of Speech 
 While Article 35 in the Chinese Constitution protects freedom of speech, the Chinese 
Communist Party does not have a strong legacy of enforcing this article. The Chinese 
government has a well-known reputation for acts preventing freedom of speech within its 
borders. The Mao era marked perhaps the height of suppression of freedom of speech in China. 
Starting with the Anti-Rightist Movement, Mao set the stage for massive oppression of free 
speech in China. The Anti-Rightist campaign was a reaction to Mao’s initial Hundred Flower’s 
Movement1. In 1957, when the chairman started the campaign, it was meant to “solicit feedback 
from the public.” However, there was such an out lash against the CCP that Mao felt the regime 
                                               
1
 The Hundred Flowers’ Movement was Mao Zedong’s reaction to the outcry of intellectuals to his policies 
in the 1950s. Mao originally requested the opinions of intellectual society on his economic and political 
policies. The resulting outpouring of discontent led Mao to kill and silence thousands of dissenters in what 
is now called the Hundred Flowers’ Movement.  
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was being called into question. Thus, he waited several weeks to “lure the snakes out,” to allow 
more intellectuals and dissidents to show their colors, and then “in early June he launched a 
systematic attack in the form of the Anti-Rightist campaign against those who has spoken out” 
(Joseph 75). Those labeled “rightists” were sent to the countryside to reform through labor. 
Far more devastating on both the population of China and the survival of free speech was 
the Cultural Revolution. The Revolution officially occurred from mid-1966 to 1968, but the 
effect on the society was so devastating that this period is referred to as the “Cultural Revolution 
decade”, spanning from 1966 to 1976 (Joseph 83). The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to 
reinvigorate the revolutionary spirit of the youth of China, while also removing the “Four Olds” 
(sì jiù四旧) from Chinese society: Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas. In 
essence, Mao inspired the Chinese youth to revolt against their teachers and parents, and to go in 
search of the Four Olds and destroy everything that appeared to embrace an old concept. These 
youth formed what became known as the Red Guard, and these motley troops of teenagers 
ransacked temples, burned houses of those with a bad class background, and assaulted and killed 
intellectuals, capitalists, foreigners, and anyone who did not firmly uphold the Mao ideology. 
The official “cleansing of class ranks” campaign occurred from 1968 to 1969, and combined 
with further suppressive killings from 1970-1972, killed in total roughly 1.5 million people 
(Joseph 88). During this period, free speech was “allowed,” if by allowed one means “you may 
espouse one and only one ideology, or die.” In essence, divergence of thought in any way, shape, 
or form became a death sentence. This period marked the height of oppression of freedom of 
speech in modern Chinese history. 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Party line was still the only opinion tolerated 
and deemed valid, and even higher-ups in the Chinese Communist Party had to abide by the 
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strict rules of obedience to the Mao ideology. Freedom of speech was not a concept in Maoist era 
China, and even after Mao died, deviation from the Party line was cause for imprisonment. Post-
Mao, freedom of speech was expanded slightly, wherein it was no longer as punishable to speak 
one’s political views, so long as they did not directly challenge Party doctrine.  
However, perhaps the best known single act of oppression of freedom of speech by the 
government was the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, where over a million protestors 
gathered in Tiananmen Square in Beijing to protest the government. This crackdown occurred 
under the regime governed by Deng Xiaoping. The protests began on April 15th, 1989 as a mass 
mourning over the death of former CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who had been removed 
from government due to his support for political liberalization of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). On the day of Hu's funeral, over 100,000 people had gathered at Tiananmen Square. 
What started as a mass mourning was transformed by students into a movement for further 
political liberalization and economic reform, pushing for a more aggressive transformation of 
economy and state. What started as 100,000 protestors turned into over a million people gathered 
in Tiananmen Square and expanding into surrounding streets. Other non-violent protests were 
also simultaneously occurring in major cities throughout China, including Shanghai and Wuhan. 
The primarily non-violent nature of the movement makes it a case of civil resistance. This public 
protest to demand for democracy (minzhu民主) was not well-received by the Chinese 
government, who did not want to hear the grievances of this motley assortment of students, 
workers, and peasants. By the end of a month and a half of protest, the government dispatched 
the army to fire upon the protestors. Premier Li Peng, a hardline conservative, declared martial 
law on May 20th and executed it on June 4th, ordering the People's Liberation Army to remove 
the protestors from the square. The PLA, under the orders of Deng Xiaoping, fired upon the 
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crowds to force the protestors from Tiananmen Square. The exact number of civilian deaths is 
not known, and the majority of estimates range from several hundred to thousands. This act of 
violence led to China being shunned by the international community for almost three years. 
 Today, China’s government is more permissive of freedom of speech, compared to this 
history of abuses. However, it still heavily restricts speech relating to government policy on 
issues that relate to the governments’ key initiatives for the future. For example, criticisms of 
China’s economic progress, questioning the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule, and trying to incite 
rebellions have all been cause in the past for the Chinese government to censor speech. In 
essence, China chooses to silence freedom of speech when the content of the speech leads to 
citizens questioning the Chinese government’s ability to rule. Regime stability, for the CCP, is a 
primary reason for silencing speech. 
THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
A Marketplace of Ideas 
 In the West, the notion of governance most closely associated with freedom of speech is 
the “marketplace of ideas.” This term was coined first by  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 
1919 dissent in Abrams v. United States, when he introduced it into Supreme Court doctrine. 
Holmes’ argument was that society's ultimate good "is better reached by free trade in ideas - that 
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market” (Hopkins 41). Grounded in the free speech theory of John Stuart Mill, this is the model 
of freedom of speech governance most commonly invoked in the United States, and it “is the 
model most called upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in the resolution of free-expression cases,” 
where “justices have used the theory in the adjudication of virtually every area of First 
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Amendment law” (Hopkins 40). Essentially, the modern argument goes that the reason 
governments suffer the potential harms involved with letting citizens speak their mind is that 
these ideas can create a marketplace, both intellectual and economic, which will feed the nation.  
In countries like China, this idea also holds traction. During the 1990s, when Deng 
Xiaoping was re-opening and revolutionizing the Chinese economy post-Tiananmen Square, the 
Internet was also being introduced into China. From the beginning, the Internet was seen as a 
potentially strong economic actor, although it wasn’t until the late ‘90s that it became clear 
exactly how lucrative the Internet could be when utilized. One of the reasons proposed for why 
China allows some degree of freedom of speech and access to the Internet is precisely because 
this modicum of freedom can provide large economic benefits. For example, Alibaba is currently 
one of China’s most successful business enterprises, and this company focuses the majority of its 
economic activities in the business-to-business sector online. The company had an initial public 
offering on the Hong Kong stock market for 1.5 billion dollars, making it one of China’s most 
successful IPOs (Einhorn). However, the marketplace of ideas model does not explain why 
governments allow for people to make statements against the central governmental authority, 
statements which have no potential to mobilize intellectual or market forces. Two other models, 
the safety valve and the surveillance method, give greater insight into the potential reasons the 
government allows citizens to protest the government’s actions that do not have direct links to 
economic activity. 
The Safety Valve 
 The concept of the safety valve is central in how freedom of speech is conceived as a tool 
in governance. Thomas Emerson, professor at the Yale Law School and First Amendment 
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scholar, first coined the term “safety valve” in relation to free speech. He asserted that freedom 
of speech acted as important agent of regime stability by allowing citizens to air grievances in 
non-violent fashions. Also, this freedom of speech acted as an important feedback mechanism 
for the government, who can listen to the people’s complaints and respond to them through 
policy changes (Lipschultz 52). This notion of freedom of speech as a safety valve has 
implications for how the US, the EU, China, and other governments can view freedom of speech 
not as a just a right of citizens, but as a tool of governance.  
This safety valve theory ties in with social contract theory, in that the safety valve model 
relies on the notion of mutual benefit, which states that citizens give up some autonomy in order 
to gain other rights. The three main theorists of social contract theory, John Locke, Thomas 
Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, all approach this theory through a different lens. John 
Locke asserts in his Second Treatise of Government that the people would live in peace in nature, 
but individuals choose to cede some of their power to the government so that they may be 
shielded from aggressors who might take their goods. Hobbes has a very different claim, that the 
humans are inherently born into chaos, and that people sacrifice certain freedoms to the 
government for some semblance of stability and thus the ability to sustain growth of a society. 
According to Hobbes, man in nature has claim to everything, including “one anothers body,” and 
so long as that is true, man can act in violence against other man, and “there can be no security to 
any man, (how strong or wise soever he be)” (Hobbes 107). Laying out this theory in his seminal 
work, The Leviathan, Hobbes asserts that the government and the people forge a social contract 
to maintain the protection of the people and the power of the government.  
Rousseau further adds to this literature with his Du Contract Social, in which he asserts 
that man has a more familial relationship with society and has freedoms which cannot be ceded: 
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“To renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s quality as man, the rights of humanity, and 
even its duties…such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man.” (Rousseau 45). 
Rousseau notes that people enter into a “social pact,” wherein there is a “form of association that 
will defend and protect the person and goods of each association with the full common force, and 
by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as 
before.” (Rousseau 49-50). Rousseau argues people band together to protect these sacred rights 
and freedoms, creating a collective, cohesive social contract in communal pursuit of defending 
rights. These three frameworks help create the notion of the social contract that describes the 
relationship between governments and their citizens whom they serve. 
Inherent in all of these theories is the presence of communication between the 
government and the people. Be it through elections, referendums, or the simple act of speaking, 
government needs to elicit the opinion of the people if it is to adapt to the needs of its citizens. 
Governments who fail to take their citizens’ evolving needs into account will be in violation of 
the social contract, and risk being overthrown. Hence, the safety valve has two purposes: to 
allow the citizens to vent frustration non-violently, and for the government to hear the grievances 
of the people. 
 However, this second benefit of the safety valve, allowing the government to understand 
the needs of the people, can be optimized through surveillance. Simply waiting for the people to 
accumulate frustration to the point of protesting is a game of chance. After all, if the government 
is not monitoring the people’s reactions to policy changes, the frustration of the people may not 
be sufficiently vented through the safety valve, and thus violence may still occur. Most 
governments thus employ a second method of interacting with their people to keep the social 
contract alive: surveillance. 
17 
 
The Surveillance Method 
A long tradition of political theory has observed that states structure themselves to better 
watch their citizens. Political theory on government control states that governments create 
societies that foster communal actions by having strict rules and guidelines for behavior, 
enforced by government surveillance and interference in daily lives. John Bentham’s Panopticon 
is perhaps one of the best examples of this model of governance. The panopticon is a building 
designed to allow an observer to watch everyone in an institution without the observed knowing 
they are being watched. His original design comprised a circular structure with an "inspection 
house" at its center, with the observed sitting in the perimeter of the building. Bentham originally 
conceived this sort of building as being useful in hospitals, schools, insane asylums and, most 
famously, prisons. 
 
18 
 
Bentham’s Panopticon, realized by a state penitentiary2 
Michel Foucault builds upon the panopticon model in his work Discipline and Punish, 
where he says this is not just a building design, but rather a societal structure and model for 
governance. Foucault argues that the panopticon is a metaphor for modern "disciplinary" 
societies, which have an intense need to use surveillance to control their populations by creating 
the societal framework such that people are rewarded for policing and self-regulating their own 
behavior, with no violent intervention needed by the state to enforce compliance. Foucault takes 
Bentham’s physical structure and analyses how this design is also a social one. In essence, 
Foucault argues the panopticon has come to define government relations with societies, wherein 
the government observes and controls the civilian population, always watching but never overtly 
“seen” by the people, who merely feel the moral implications of the government’s gaze but 
cannot place the government as the observer. 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish begins with him describing the end of corporal 
punishment as the tried and true method of punishing, and how torture as punishment has moved 
from the public square into privacy, and from physical punishment to societal exclusion and 
mental torture. From here, he progresses to say that even as punishment has become a hidden 
part of the penal process, the effectiveness of punishment is still due to the punishment’s 
inevitability (Foucault 11). Now, it is the conviction itself, rather than the violent punishment, 
which stigmatizes the offender (Foucault 16). 
                                               
2http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_KDKHSAy2hEw/TIhXEdYDX3I/AAAAAAAAAY4/d5RKD97qbS8/s1600/large.p
anopticon.jpg 
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From here, Foucault further builds how societies create these social punishments within 
the framework of the Panopticon. Here, the society itself creates a system where the citizens can 
all watch each other, and everyone opts into this system willingly. 
There is no risk, therefore, that the increase of power created by the 
panoptic machine may degenerate into tyranny; the disciplinary mechanism will 
be democratically controlled, since it will be constantly accessible ‘to the great 
tribunal committee of the world.’ This Panopticon, subtly arranged so that an 
observer may observe, at a glance, so many different individuals, also enables 
everyone to come and observe any of the observers.” (Foucault 207) 
 
Thus, in a democratic system, as Foucault claims, people still elect to be within this 
system of conformity and constant surveillance, where every citizen watches the other, and the 
government watches everyone. 
The question is why everyone would opt into such a social framework. For Foucault, the 
answer lies in economic efficiency, the utility of obeying, and the need for constant surveillance 
to make sure the society functions like a well-oiled machine. 
 
“The Panopticon, on the other hand, has a role of amplification; although 
it arranges power, although it is intended to make it more economic and more 
effective, it does so not for power itself, nor for the immediate salvation of a 
threatened society: its aim is to strengthen the social forces- to increase 
production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of public 
morality; to increase and multiply.” (p. 208) 
 
Thus, Foucault creates the narrative of societies of surveillance. However, implicit in this 
analysis is the absence of true freedom of expression. As everyone is watching one another, each 
is ready to silence a dissenter. As Oscar J. Handy notes in his book The Panoptic Sort, Foucault 
creates the argument that panopticons are designed to normalize actors within a society, to create 
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and sustain conformity: “It is critical to note that the purpose of the modern prison and of other 
panoptic system that imitate its technology is not punishment, but transformation, rehabilitation, 
and correct training. The same may be said of the panoptic sort: It is not limited to identification, 
classification, and assessment, but includes the goal of normalizing behavior within categories” 
(Handy 24). He establishes three types of normalizing: surveillance, or hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgment, or punishing nonconformity and promoting conformity, and examination 
of members. In essence, the panopticon does not allow for true free speech, or true dissent. One 
must always be in line with the system, or the system will realign the dissenter. 
THE INTERNET AGE 
 In the 21st century, the Internet has created a new, online forum in which people express 
themselves, and has become the newest arena for freedom of speech to flourish. However, as the 
Internet has grown as an influential medium in the EU, the US and China, these governments 
have been forced to confront free speech issues on the Internet. Faced with social networks that 
allow for comments to travel continents in seconds, these governments have needed to adjust 
their governance model in accordance with this advancement in technology. More importantly, 
the Internet allows governments to implement the surveillance model more thoroughly than in 
prior eras, as people willingly post personal information to Facebook, Twitter, and other sites 
which the government can access easily. At the same time, however, these governments have 
been forced to confront dissent on the Internet as an influential factor in policy successes, as 
thousands of citizens can galvanize dissent in cyberspace to reject government policies. Thus, 
discourse control on the Internet has become an increasingly implemented governance tactic for 
moderating, monitoring and manipulating speech. 
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The US 
Contemporary social critics frequently cite Foucault, asserting that technology has 
allowed the government to better implement panoptic structures to control society and diminish 
freedom of speech. Social media is perhaps the best panopticon yet. In the United States, social 
networking sites are doing the panoptic work for the government. Not only are websites like 
Facebook and Twitter omnipresent in society now, but they also allow citizens to opt into a 
system where the government can access every level of social interaction across time and social 
networks. Social media, used in conjunction with Google user search results and ISPs, allow the 
government to track civilians better than ever before. Now, in the post Patriot Act era, the 
government has increased abilities to watch the actions of the people.  
The EU 
The EU also has clauses protecting “freedom of expression,” which is quite expansive, 
spanning from human rights, democratization language, to Internet usage. In terms of Internet 
dissemination of information, the European Union’s “Resolution on the information society, the 
management of the Internet and democracy” establishes that it is the duty of Member States “to 
ensure that the new facilities are used to promote freedom of speech and information, exchanges 
between cultures, education and civic participation in public life, in particular in relation to EU 
enlargement or international contacts with countries whose peoples live under authoritarian and 
repressive regimes” (EUR-Lex). In other words, the EU prioritizes freedom of access to 
information, especially in relation to “repressive regimes.”  
The EU also has the power to rule against some of the actions of member states. For 
example, in 2004, the EU Parliament ruled that the Italian government’s lack of a pluralistic 
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media was in violation of the freedom of expression espoused by the European Union. It also 
surveyed other EU nations to determine how pluralistic their media representation was, with 
varying results. Germany was found not in violation of the freedom of expression in regards to 
their wiretaps of journalists: “surveillance of telecommunications (i.e. tracing of journalists' 
phone calls) did not constitute a breach of constitutional liberties as provided for in articles of the 
Basic Law, which guarantee confidentiality of information” (EUR-Lex). While Germany’s 
surveillance taps were seen as a minor issue, Italy was cautioned that it needs to diversify its 
media sources: “MEPs invited the Italian Parliament to "accelerate its work on the reform of the 
audiovisual sector in accordance with the recommendations of the Italian constitutional court and 
the President of the Republic, taking account of the provisions in the Gasparri bill which are 
incompatible with Community law, as noted by those authorities". Parliament voiced concern 
that the situation in Italy could arise in other Member States if a media magnate chose to enter 
politics” (EUR-Lex). In essence, the EU does have the ability to judge the actions of its members 
in regards to freedom of speech. 
China 
The Chinese government maintains an extensive system of media control. Between the 
Propaganda Bureau that chooses how the media can portray certain events and the Fifty Cent 
Party, the cohort of web watchers that the government hires to police web forums searching for 
dissidents, the Chinese Communist Party has finely tuned its methods of controlling the Internet 
and the media. The Propaganda Bureau and other government agencies work together to pursue 
one key goal: ensuring that “netizens” of China, Chinese citizens who use the Internet, do not 
turn it into a medium of protest or a mechanism for rallying political power against the state. 
Ashley Esarey, Columbia University researcher and PhD candidate, is quoted as saying in Asia 
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Online Times of July 22, 2004, that "all online media [chat rooms excepted] are required to use 
content provided by mainstream media. This content is subject to strict party monitoring. There 
is almost no content widely accessible in China that is not monitored by the Propaganda 
Department [of the communist party]," (Borton). The Propaganda Bureau determines the 
mainstream content, but web forums are not mainstream content, since their content is 
determined by citizens posting online. Therefore, forums are patrolled by anonymous 
government officials or by members of the Fifty Cent Party, who will remove posts from web 
forums, shut down forums entirely, and even go so far as to track down those who post 
incendiary comments. One famous instance of how far this censorship can go was that of a 
woman who called herself the “Stainless Steel Mouse” (Borton). The government tracked her 
online activity for weeks before finally arresting her on counts of sedition for writing blog posts 
criticizing the government. She was released after a year in prison, and has not returned to 
blogging since her detainment. 
 Given this tight control of free speech, it seems that China’s Constitution, especially its 
freedom of speech clause, is pointless. Looking at the history would indicate that the Chinese do 
not value freedom of speech. Yet, if that is the case, why did Deng Xiaoping keep the free 
speech clause? Is it just a lip service to liberal Western notions of “good governance”? Or is 
there something about the history of China and free speech that this narrative misses? Could a 
government so bent on controlling its people see a utility in keeping free speech an option for its 
people?  
 The Chinese government needs this clause; it allows the Chinese government to better 
control its population. By allowing a modicum of free speech, by allowing blogs and web forums 
to exist, the Chinese government gives the illusion of the people fighting back against the 
24 
 
government, when in fact, these mediums are just ways for the government to better watch the 
people. This safety valve provides citizens with some ability to release their anger at the 
government on web forums, a far preferable method than inciting riots in the streets or other 
alternatives. However, allowing speech also has that secondary, surveillance benefit. The 
Propaganda Bureau and the Fifty Cent Party, by allowing people to speak their mind on issues, 
can see what the public opinion actually is before silencing it. By doing so, the government can 
respond to citizen criticisms in a more effective fashion than if the government was not privy to 
public opinion. In a system without elections for national office, the Chinese government needs 
this connection to the minds of the Chinese people to maintain regime stability. 
THESIS 
The central question of this thesis addresses how governments use freedom of speech and 
protest as a means of controlling a population and enhancing regime stability. As previously 
established, Western notions of freedom of speech emphasize the rights of the individual to 
speak, but have also established the grounds upon which a government can manipulate 
discourses developed from freedom of speech, thus using free speech as a governance tool. In the 
modern era, where the Internet allows for the government to monitor its citizens more closely 
than ever, these regimes permit freedom of speech as a way of trapping potential dissidents, co-
opting their ideas when useful, and deflecting social tensions towards less threatening ends when 
necessary. When examining the models of Internet governance theory, the marketplace of ideas, 
the safety valve, and the surveillance model, the surveillance model is most influential in Internet 
governance and freedom of speech. The US, the EU, and China all use the surveillance model as 
a way of maintaining regime stability and promoting government initiatives. This thesis will 
examine how China, the EU, and the US, in specific scenarios, have used the Internet as a means 
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of observing civilian response to government oversight or government initiatives before turning 
this discourse resulting from free speech into a method of actively maintaining regime stability 
through controlling and manipulating citizen discourse.  
METHODOLOGY 
Discourse Analysis 
In investigating my central question, I use discourse analysis as the predominant 
methodology. This approach lends itself to a deeper understanding of the power dynamics that 
underpin the operation of freedom of speech. Discourse analysis focuses on examining types of 
discourse to uncover hidden political agendas in conversations surrounding a variety of issues. 
By examining three main rhetorical methods of controlling discourse, manipulations, 
propagation tactics, and memes, I will investigate how governments controlled discourse. 
 A discourse in academia is broadly defined as the narrative of academic thought. When 
research papers are written, they are grounded in the context of the theorists who precede the 
paper’s inception. For example, in a paper on discourse analysis, one must reference past 
political theorists who developed the field of discourse. The field of discourse analysis dates 
back to Aristotle, who laid the foundations of rhetoric through logos (logic), ethos (ethical 
appeal), and pathos (emotional appeals). Michel Foucault, creator of the Panopticon as a social 
construct, also first developed the field of discourse analysis in his works The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 and Discipline and Punish. In this thesis, pursuant to 
Foucault’s post-modern definition of discourse, the case studies will examine power dynamics of 
discourse, unspoken actions that frame the discourse, different actors in the discourse, in addition 
to elements in the conversation of the discourse, specifically manipulation, propagation, and 
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memes, to prove that the surveillance model is becoming the predominant means of controlling 
free speech in China, the US, and the EU. 
From Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault gives the definitions for discourse. In short, 
there are two kinds of discourse that Foucault identifies; discourses in disciplines of study and in 
formulation of arguments, and discourse surrounding the form of how ideas are presented. This 
thesis will focus on the former, how discourses in the digital age are formed. Concerning this 
kind of discourse, Foucault explains that it is what is not said that is the most important in 
identifying a discourse: “all manifest discourse is secretly based on an ‘already-said’; and that 
this ‘already-said’ is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already 
been written, but a ‘never-said’, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath, a writing 
that is merely the hollow of its own mark…the manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more 
than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this ‘not-said’ is a hollow that 
undermines from within all that is said.” (Foucault, 1972: 25). Foucault here explains that what 
goes on behind the formulation of a discourse is never revealed directly in the discourse itself. 
For example, in the case of ACTA, the writers of ACTA would never say, “We are writing this 
agreement because copyrights are a framework to which our governments adhere; therefore, in 
order to maintain our governments’ legitimacy, we must pursue copyrights as a policy issue.” 
However, implicit in the ACTA agreement is this very concept; that such an obligation exists. 
As Foucault states in History of Sexuality, discourses are not just the weapons of the 
government; it is also the means of resistance for the people: 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, 
any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and 
unstable process whereby discourse can be both instrument and an effect of power, 
27 
 
but also hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for 
an opposition strategy (Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100-101) 
I investigate how power operates in free speech regulations to allow and silence speech in 
my case studies on China, the US and the EU. Civilians are often both the victims and utilizers of 
discourse. When using freedom of expression and speech, civilians can take control of the 
discourse, removing it from solely government control. Given the fickle nature of discourse, the 
government must be wary of citizens, corporations, and other outside actors taking control of the 
discourse and manipulating it against the government, hence the importance of regulating 
freedom of speech. 
Looking at the politics behind the discourse, behind the words being uttered, is a critical 
part of this process. At times, the discourse will include what is not being said. As Foucault 
frames it, discourse is fluid in this manner, moving between what can concretely be framed as 
the conversation, and what occurs behind the scenes. 
To be more precise, we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between 
accepted discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse 
and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come 
into play in various strategies. It is this distribution that we must reconstruct, with 
the things said and those concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden, 
that it comprises; with the variants and different effects… (Foucault, History of 
Sexuality, 100) 
 
As such, this thesis will be examining both words spoken and actions left outside of the 
conversation. The discourse analysis will include not just the rhetoric of the statements made, but 
also the context behind which the comments were discussed and actions taken that do not enter 
the discourse. For example, when the government acts behind closed doors, the consequences of 
said actions affects the discourse, even though words may not have been explicitly uttered. 
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Additionally, this thesis will examine the nature of the actors in the discourse. As 
Foucault notes, discourses are framed “according to who is speaking, his position of power, the 
institutional context in which he happens to be situated” (Foucault, History of Sexuality, 100). 
For this reason, this thesis will be examining issues from multiple perspectives in each case, 
looking through the eyes of not just the government and the people, but also the national and 
international media, and in the case of the US and EU cases, corporations for and against the acts 
and agreements in question. In this way, the case studies more fully examine the aspects of the 
discourse as framed by different players with different positions of power and different 
institutional contexts. 
In discourse analysis, the concepts of manipulation, propagation and memes are keys to 
understanding the role a discourse has on the audience. As Paul Chilton notes in “Manipulation, 
memes and metaphors,” in discourse analysis, propagation refers to how effectively ideas are 
spread and in some cases also refers to propaganda, manipulation refers to how ideas are framed 
in a way that persuades an audience, and memes are discourses framed in such a way that a 
member of a society can easily identify the concept. As Chilton describes it, “Dawkin’s approach 
sometimes suggests memes are blind self-replicators, transmuted by random mutation as they go 
from mind to mind, he also sometimes emphasizes the idea of memetic ‘contagion’. The latter 
suggests some memes in some circumstances, given certain kinds of actors, are likely to ‘spread’ 
more than others” (Saussare and  Chilton 16). These three concepts impact how ideas spread in a 
society and come to have political power. 
Successfully utilizing manipulation, propagation, and memes is the key to controlling 
discourse. Various factors, such as societal standing, affect an individual’s ability to utilize these 
tools. As Chilton describes it, discourses are propagated with varying degrees of effectiveness. 
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Mainly, the “forceful spreading of ideas, ‘propagation’, depends largely on the ability of the 
propagator to control or dominate an intended receiver’s mind by controlling the channel of 
communication or depriving the receiver of the potential to verify.” (Saussare and Chilton 17) In 
other words, those who speak loudest in society, who are best able to disseminate their idea, 
while also preventing other voices or ideas from being heard, will be the most effective at 
propagation. Those occupying visible spaces in society, like politicians or other public figures, 
have a wider audience of potentially interested listeners who will be manipulated into believing 
and spreading an idea. Beyond the individual, groups can hold these societal positions of power 
as well. In the case of corporations like Google and Wikipedia, which hold a near-monopoly on 
the search engine and free encyclopedia market, their ubiquity means that their voice holds 
greater weight. Not only are they highly visible to the public, but they also have the ability to 
control discourse because they are the first source of information easily available to Internet 
readers. In the case of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the power of the Internet-based 
corporations in propagation is particularly relevant. 
In order to prove that governments allow freedom of speech in order to better control 
their population, this thesis will examine a few specific protest movements. First, I will examine 
the web forum interactions of netizens in China, and how their interactions directly influenced 
government policy, even without ever directly speaking with a government official. I will focus 
on forums with high volume of comments and visits; in other words, I will be paying attention to 
the blogs and forums which have the most visibility, and are therefore most likely to be 
monitored by the government. From here, I will look for a contentious issue which received a lot 
of blog attention, which then became a policy issue for the Chinese government. Then, based on 
this case study, I will discuss why Chinese leadership needed the modicum of free speech that it 
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allows, so that it has a means of controlling its population in the absence of democratic systems 
of feedback. 
In the US and the EU, I will be focusing on the Stop Online Piracy Act and the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, respectively, as case studies concerning freedom of speech 
where the government controlled discourse. These cases differ from the Chinese case in two 
important respects. First, the governments in neither case used overt censorship as a means of 
controlling the discourse; to do so would have been patently illegal in both legal systems. 
Secondly, the means by which the US and EU control the discourse is in actions taken behind the 
scenes; it is in the silence of the discourse, as opposed to the overt statements, that the control of 
the discourse comes to the light. In these cases, the governments rely heavily on the 
manipulations, propagation, and memes mentioned earlier in the discourse analysis section in 
order to control the spoken discourse. Behind the discourse, these governments use tabling of 
legislation and private negotiations as methods of moving the government agenda forward, 
without having to consult the public directly on how to proceed. In this manner, the governments 
have the ability to frame and reframe the discourse until it lands in their favor. 
As a minor facet of the methodology, I will also be taking inspiration from Guobin 
Yang’s framework for handling web forum observation in order to analyze this data in the most 
methodologically sound manner. Guobin Yang uses what he terms the “Multi-interactionism” 
method, wherein he focuses on foreground internet activism in interaction with state power, 
cultures of contention, the market economy, civil society, and transnationalism. Political scholars 
like Guobin Yang and Elizabeth Perry frequently use this approach as a way of discerning 
symbols and meaning-making in a culture. By examining historical elements, contextual clues, 
and cultural issues, multi-interactionism gains a fuller understanding of the underlying 
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implications of discourse across cultures and regimes by using social media as a medium for 
research. Thus, I will be implementing the same methodology in analyzing web forums. 
CHAPTERS 
This thesis will cover these issues in three chapters. In the second chapter, I will focus on 
the Wenzhou train crash case study on Chinese free speech and the Internet, examining web 
forums and translating commentary, while simultaneously looking at government responses to 
these web forums. Chapter 3 will focus on the Stop Online Piracy Act in the United States as a 
piece of legislation that provoked a battle over the discourse of freedom of speech between the 
US government officials, corporations, and citizens. Chapter 4 will examine the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in the EU, specifically how the EU is managing to successfully 
pursue such an unpopular issue with the public. Chapter 5, the conclusion, will tie together these 
case studies to show that, ultimately, freedom of speech is not as simple as a person just speaking 
their mind.  
More importantly, freedom of speech is less about the rights of an individual, and more 
about what rights individuals are permitted to keep by their governments. After all, social 
contract theory states that a citizen signs away his rights to a government when he consents to 
being a citizen of a nation. Freedom of speech is one of the rights that a citizen may demand in 
order to validate his citizenship, but ultimately, the government may choose to revoke this right 
if it interferes with the government’s prime directive: governmental stability. In the end, this 
thesis seeks to prove that there is more nuance to freedom of speech than the simple presence or 
absence of the right. Freedom of speech is a continuum, and freedom of speech is a tool, a tool 
used by individual citizens that can be turned against the citizens. 
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Chapter 2: China Case Study 
Micro-blogging and Other Dangerous High-Speed Projects 
 
Concerning issues of internet governance and freedom of speech, China’s government is 
frequently referred to as an example of a government that relies on censorship to govern freedom 
of speech. China’s current population, according to the World Bank, is 1.33 billion people, 
approximately a sixth of the total world population. According to the Chinese Internet Network 
Information Center, as of last year, there were 420 million Chinese “netizens” surfing the web, 
plus 277 million mobile phone users with access to the Internet, placing internet penetration at 
31.8% of the Chinese population ("中国网民规模达 4.2亿 手机上网用户 2.77亿."). With 
nearly a third of Chinese citizens using the Internet as a main source of media, it has become a 
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tool for change, a fountain of knowledge, and most recently, a forum for social protest. The 
government of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, has noticed this trend, and from the 
beginning it has actively shaped how the citizens of China participate in online discourse. By 
examining one case in particular, that of the Wenzhou train crash, it becomes clear that the 
Chinese government opts to use a panoptic, surveillance model of internet governance in order to 
control how citizens use freedom of speech. In turn, this model of governance shows that 
China’s government uses freedom of speech as a tool of achieving its own initiatives, and that 
allowing some amount of free speech actually helps them convince their citizens better than if 
they completely silenced the entire discourse. 
 
The Evolution of the Chinese Internet 
According to Professor Guobin Yang of Columbia University, Chinese internet 
censorship underwent three phases of government policy evolution. In the first phase, from 1994 
to 1999, the government focused on regulating network security, provided a framework for 
internet service provisions, and began structuring institutions for regulation. China’s first major 
policy framework regarding internet regulation was the “Regulations Concerning the Safety and 
Protection of Computer Information Systems,” which outlined principles for government control 
of the internet and vested power in the Ministry of Public Security as the governing body of the 
Internet (Yang 48).  The second major policy document was the “Computer Information 
Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations,” which made China’s 
Internet service providers (ISPs) responsible for upholding the regulations set by the government. 
This document also detailed the nine types of information that were to be prohibited online, 
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including prohibiting the distribution of information which violates laws or the constitution, and 
spreading rumors or information which damages the credibility of the state (Yang 49). The 
second stage, from 2000 to 2002, expanded and refined Internet control, targeting both Internet 
content providers and individual consumers. BBSs (bulletin board services, also known as web 
forums) were required to follow a licensing procedure, and BBSs referencing forbidden words 
like “Falun Gong” or “June Fourth” were liable to be blocked by the government.  
In the third stage, from 2003 to now, there has been, as Yang puts it, “the expansion of 
Internet regulation and control from government to governance to governmentality.” The 
distinction between these terms is that government comprises the formal institutions, rules, and 
practices of the state, while governance comprises both formal and informal actors. 
Governmentality denotes “the cultural and social context out of which modes of governance 
arise and by which they are sustained” (Yang 48-49). In essence, in the third phase, the Internet 
regulations become internalized on a cultural level. Instead of the government needing to 
constantly remind every citizen of the censorship rules, citizens began to internalize that certain 
topics would always be banned from web forums. For example, Tibet, the Falun Gong, and other 
topics are known to be taboo, and people simply won’t discuss them, unless they want to 
knowingly aggravate the government. 
The Surveillance Model in China 
Looking at Foucault’s panopticism as a model for governance, also known as the 
surveillance method, it becomes clear that China has reached a panoptic state, in that China uses 
the Propaganda Bureau and other surveillance-focused bureaus to allow the Chinese government 
to actively observe every Chinese citizen on the internet without the citizen knowing when they 
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are being watched. Foucault, who first established the framework of the panoptic state, asserts 
the basic premise that knowledge is power, and that the government derives all power over its 
citizens by controlling information and narratives of knowledge. From this basic premise, 
Foucault notes that a panoptic state has two goals: first, isolate those who are “the deviant, the 
diseased, or the dissenters” (Gandy 10) and second, to normalize the rest of the society by 
establishing solid “norms” of thought which the people must follow (Gandy 11). In a perfectly 
functioning surveillance model state, the government will first censor materials as a way of 
marking those who are deviants, those who are not to be emulated, and to remove ideas that are 
considered undesirable from the government. Second, the people, seeking to avoid punishment, 
will internalize notions of what can and cannot be said. In other words, people began to exhibit 
self-censoring behavior as a result of internalizing the government’s narrative of knowledge.  
China displays many of the classic elements of a panoptic state as understood in 
Foucauldian terms. As Yang demonstrates, the final stage of freedom of speech control in China 
is that the government has managed to make the people internalize this control mechanism, 
creating a society of citizens that engage in self-censoring, which is then reinforced by active 
government censorship that leaves only the opinions of which the government approves. The 
Chinese authorities allows a temporary window in time for freedom for citizens to speak on the 
internet, so that the government can determine which opinions and narratives it wishes to 
endorse as “normal”. Before censoring begins, the government watches what comments are 
posted. In this case study, we will see that the government did not start censoring content until 
well after they knew about the train crash controversy. Then, the government develops their 
response and begins censoring all opinions deemed dangerous to this new central narrative. The 
surveillance method is characterized by a situation where the government can see everything that 
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is posted, and has the ability to control all that is posted. As a result, the government can safely 
allow some level of “freedom of speech” for a time, in order to see what people believe. Then, 
the government can respond to these points of view, or remove them from the public sphere, with 
little worry that the speech will create instability in the society that could uproot the government.  
In short, the surveillance model is “a flexible engine. It can be used to decide what sorts 
of facts constitute information, to determine what sorts of information ought to be privileged and 
which do not matter, to gather that information, to empower people or entities to gather 
information, to act on the information gathered” (Backer 4). The Chinese government is in the 
privileged position to use this model; to decide what is factual and what is fictitious, to rewrite 
narratives, to stop others from speaking or allow others to speak when they see fit.  
The Chinese government has various tools available to it in order to maintain its control 
over Internet discourse. Three of its main tools are the blocking of posting specific words on  
blogs, denial of service for specific websites, and the Fifty Cent Party. The first tool allows the 
Chinese government to silence specific issues before anything can even be posted. The 
government’s special project, “The Golden Shield,” the government Internet policing force, 
issues lists of censored terms to web service providers and specific websites, like blogging 
platforms (Liang and Lu 106). These platforms and ISPs are forced to comply or the government 
will shut the website down for defying a government order. The second tool, DNS, denial of 
service, stops citizens from even accessing certain pages by cutting off the computer’s ability to 
connect with the webpage. This tool is how the Chinese government prevents Facebook, Twitter, 
and several other Western sites from being accessed within China’s borders (Fallows). The final 
tool is one of idea generation. The Fifty Cent Party is not actually a party in any real sense; it is 
not a wing of the government, nor is it part of the party machinery in any formalized fashion. 
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The term describes the hordes of workers the government employs to isolate blog posts for 
censorship. The corps members of this group are supposed to be reimbursed 50 mao for their 
work, hence the name Fifty Cent Party. In addition, these censors will also post positive 
messages about the government as a way of counteracting negative postings online. Through 
these three tools, the government has excellent abilities to both monitor and censor Internet 
speech activity.  By examining one case study, that of the Wenzhou train crash on July 23rd, 2011, 
it becomes clear that China is opting to use this type of governance.  Indeed, the Wenzhou train 
crash becomes a chance to investigate the Chinese government’s management of media reports 
and their response to the train crash as a case study to elucidate China’s surveillance model of 
free speech. 
The Wenzhou Train Crash 
 On July 23rd, 2011, it is commonly accepted throughout the world that a 16-car working 
train D3115 was hit from the rear by Beijing – Fuzhou train D301, a high-speed railway train, on 
a viaduct platform in Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, China ("First Fatal Crash on Chinese High 
Speed Line”). This crash resulted in a significant number of injuries and deaths; the exact 
number of those dead varies based on different government and media accounts. It is also widely 
known that the Chinese government has placed great import in recent years on the growth of 
China’s high-speed railways. The Chinese government has decided to spend 113 billion dollars a 
year “on railway infrastructure and rolling stock in the next four years, all funded under an 
ambitious build-out initiated by the 2004-2020 mid and long-term railway development plan by 
China's Ministry of Railways” (Fischer). This is part of a larger, 293 billion dollar plan to lay 
down 16,000 kilometers of “dedicated high-speed rail lines connecting all of China's major cities 
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by 2020”, which would create a total of 120,000 kilometers of rail in China, making it the largest 
rail expansion in the history of the world (Fischer).  
Due to the money involved in this project, and the avid desire for the government to 
expand the railway system, the Wenzhou train crash was immediately a crisis for the Chinese 
government. This crash has the potential to call into question the safety of the Chinese railway 
development project, and has broader implications for China’s rapid modernization. These future 
development projects are foundational to the CCP’s claim to legitimate governance, which is 
partially based on its ability to deliver strong economic results.  
The government took an active role in how this event was portrayed in the media because 
this crash had the potential to affect the Chinese people’s perception of the government’s 
legitimacy. As a result, the facts surrounding this case have been written and rewritten, 
constructed and reconstructed, countless times, through the censorship of the Chinese 
government. By examining what the Chinese government chose to censor, this case study will 
show that the Chinese Communist Party follows a panoptic model of governance. First, the 
government allowed commentary to continue on the issue only if it followed the party’s desired 
timeline of the truth, thus granting “freedom of speech” in a highly limited sense. Second, and 
more importantly, it is significant that the government did not shut down Sina Weibo or any 
microblogging sites over this issue. It allowed for dissenting comments to be published, even 
though it could put in a BBS direct censoring of the words “Wenzhou train crash,” and all 
commentary would be silenced. Instead, the government has allowed for comments to be posted 
for a time before taking them down. For example, in Figure 4, the comment, “Taking a fast train 
is meant to be safe and fast; who would have thought that now it is only fast?” would normally 
be seen as a direct criticism of the government; however, it was allowed to pass through the 
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censors. By allowing the government to read these opinions, it can prepare the proper response to 
this crash which will appease the Chinese people. 
In order to best construct the discourse surrounding the Wenzhou train crash, I have 
reconstructed four timelines. In each timeline, elements of the discourse reveal how the 
government frames the discourse to control the portrayal of the train crash. In each timeline, 
there are also elements of bias, based on the institutions and the actors, as was referenced in the 
methodology section of Chapter 1. The first, the international media timeline of the events, is an 
account of what the world at large thinks is the most accurate series of the events that occurred. 
The international media here is separate from the Chinese media, in that writers from the New 
York Times and the BBC News are not held accountable for their articles by the Chinese 
government or even their own governments for that matter; writers for Xinhua do have to heed 
the government’s warnings, or they could potentially lose their jobs or be imprisoned. Thus, the 
international media timeline is more thorough by virtue of being less pliant to a specific 
government’s motives. The strength of this timeline is that it has the most cohesive factual 
structuring of events, free of censorship, so that a full delineation of the events can be described. 
There is a slight bit of  bias in the international media, as the international media takes a negative 
stance on what it perceives to be Chinese government censorship, thereby skewing public 
opinion on the government’s actions.  
The second narrative is that of the Chinese government, following its responses and 
public statements. It is necessary to see how the Chinese government frames the crash through its 
statements to the media, as well as its own publications. The bias here is something this case 
study seeks to understand: what is the government’s position, and how is it based in the 
surveillance model. Clearly, the government wants the national, China-based media portraying 
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the events in a manner that is positive towards the government, but there are more nuances here 
that will be unpacked later.  
The third narrative examined is that of the Chinese media, which has been picked apart 
by Chinese government censors; however, the Chinese media does have its own voice separate 
from the government. The benefit of examining this timeline is that the missing data speaks 
volumes. The Chinese-language publications have either been redacted from the original 
versions, or report the “cut and dry” government-issued statements. The bare-bones writing of 
the remaining articles on the crash from the Chinese press displays for the Chinese public how 
the Chinese government wants the people to discuss this issue. The timeline here seeks to capture 
what can be found of the original content, combined with the governmentally influenced 
reporting and the redacted versions. The bias here is that the Chinese news media reporting is 
heavily limited on what it can say by the Chinese government, so the Chinese news media story 
is not as fully fleshed out as its international media counterpart.  
Finally, the fourth timeline focuses on the Chinese Twitter-esque microblogging site, 
Sina Weibo (新浪微波). It was on this very website that details concerning the crash first leaked 
onto the internet. Subsequent censoring by the government has removed a number of tweets on 
the crash; however, the international media has preserved some of the original content, and some 
less controversial tweets remain on the site today. The strength of this content is that it allows for 
insight into the minds of the Chinese people, who are allowed to speak their mind on the issue, at 
least until the censors intervene. In this way, it allows for us to see what the government is 
responding to. The bias here is that the people, by the nature of being merely observers of the 
events, cannot be credentialed or considered experts in the field of high-speed railway crashes, 
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nor are they privy to all the details of this case. Instead, what they give us is the public mindset 
which the Chinese government is trying to mold. 
Comparing Timelines  
(See Figures 1-4 for reconstructed timelines) 
 In every version of this timeline, the events unfold in this pattern: on July 23, 2011, at 
approximately 8:23pm, the trains collided. Immediately after the accident, the Chinese 
government issued a report that the first train was stalled due to a lightning strike and that the 
second train collided with the first one due to a malfunction. Starting on July 26th, international 
news agencies start to question the validity of the government’s story. Experts start testifying 
that if a lightning strike has indeed stopped the train, that the other train on the track would not 
have been able to move either. On July 28th, the government acknowledges that there was a flaw 
in the train design, although the intricacies of what precisely failed are not revealed to the public. 
To this day, the exact failure remains unknown across all four timelines. In response, the 
government suspends the production of new high-speed rails, and the State Council issues a 
mandate that all safety systems of high-speed rails must be examined. In all four timelines, the 
issue of accountability becomes tantamount, and the government has not overlooked this issue. 
Between the events, the China’s government framed the discourse through information 
gathered from citizens posting on Sina Weibo, a microblog, using the surveillance model. 
Looking for details about the Wenzhou train crash from the Chinese government’s websites 
currently is like trying to find the needle in the haystack. For example, China’s Ministry of 
Railways website (http://www.china-mor.gov.cn/) has absolutely no news reports about the 
Wenzhou train crash, despite being the ministry directly responsible for the railway oversight 
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and upkeep in China. If anyone is to be blamed for the train crash, it is this ministry, and yet 
there are no reports developed on the cause of the crash to be found on the Ministry’s page. All 
that is present is a report issued on October 14, 2011, announcing that the Zhengzhou Railway 
Bureau is drawing up plans to improve their “opening and operation of high-speed rail 
equipment quality inspection and supervision and management measures" (“郑州局出台高铁开
通前设备检查管理办法”). The government reports that the international and Chinese news 
agencies cite were only oral statements or brief written ones. The world is still waiting for the 
formalized reports to be issued by the government. As the Sina Weibo bloggers complain, the 
government has been promising that they would deliver this report, and yet, over four months 
after the crash, nothing was published (See Figure 4). However, just because nothing has been 
published formally does not mean the government has been inactive in this case. On the contrary, 
by allowing the microbloggers to continue blogging, the Chinese government has given 
themselves a window into the minds of the populace, allowing them to find the most contentious 
issues amongst the people, allowing for a future report to address these key issues. The 
government utilized social media sites like Sina Weibo to extricate this information from the 
public. 
First, the government made use of the Sina Weibo outbursts to see how to respond to and  
manage the crisis. Early microbloggers posted complaints about the need for the government to 
“take responsibility,” the dangers of high speed travel, and worries about the reliability of these 
new high-speed lines. Thus, the concepts of safety and accountability were memes invoked by 
the people as a response to this crisis, and these memes, or commonly held values in a society or 
group of people, carried the discourse. These blog posts were quickly deleted, and now only exist 
in English translated forms on international news reports (See Figure 4). Afterward, the 
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government began issuing demands for better safety protocols, firing government workers, and 
Wen Jiabao began commenting on how the government will improve safety (See Figures 1, 2, 3, 
and 4). Thus, these memes were the focus of the government reaction. However, there is a reason 
the government didn’t stop all blogging about the Wenzhou crash. If the government wanted, it 
could have issued an order to all BBSs and micro-blogging platforms to not allow any postings 
containing the terms “Wenzhou crash.” They did not do so. I suggest that a very likely reason is 
so that the government could directly observe the concerns posted by its citizens. After finding 
these core issues, they then had the ability to go back and delete all evidence that the postings 
ever occurred. 
Indeed, looking at the complaints of the micro-bloggers and the subsequent government 
response to the crash, it is clear that the CCP was directly tailoring the content of the reports and 
their actions to confront issues the bloggers raised. The government immediately fired three 
officials, so as to show that the government was taking responsibility for its actions. Then, in 
response to claims about the dangers of the trains, the government mandated that all the rail line 
safety systems be re-evaluated. Even after the government fired these government officials, the 
micro-bloggers continued to protest, but the issues were now focused on reporting what exactly 
happened during the crash, and the attention turned away more from the government holding its 
workers accountable. In addition, as previously mentioned, the government then suspended the 
addition of new train lines (See Figure 3). The ongoing investigation, which will produced the 
much-anticipated report as to what exactly failed on July 23rd, is another means for the 
government to show the people that they can take responsibility for their actions, that they are 
deeply vested in the safety and reliability of these lines, and that they are taking steps to make 
sure that this incident is never repeated. It is telling that the very posts that were deleted by 
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censors (See Figure 4) contained the very accusations against the government that the CCP then 
chose to respond to directly (See Figure 3). 
This sort of behavior, the observing of the people, responding, and then removing the 
argument from the internet, is precisely the sort of behavior that describes surveillance 
governance. The discourse was altered by addressing concerns related to the memes of safety 
and accountability. The focus on these particular issues show the government was implementing 
the surveillance method and also allowed the government to regain control of the discourse from 
the people. Initially, the government had no control over how the information was leaked. 
However, instead of immediately issuing orders to restrict bloggers, the government waited for a 
day or two to see what the main concerns were. Then, after taking note of the aired grievances, 
the government promptly began censoring micro-blogs and news reports that were considered 
controversial. Concomitant with the beginning of the micro-blog censorship, the government 
also issued the directive to the media, restricting what it could publish; here, the discourse is 
taken into the “never-seen” realm, where the government has greater power to silence versions of 
the discourse of events. The orders were as follows: “1. Release death toll only according to 
figures from authorities. 2. Do not report on a frequent basis. 3. More touching stories are to be 
reported instead, i.e. blood donation, free taxi services, etc. 4. Do not investigate the causes of 
the accident; use information released from authorities as standard. 5. Do not reflect or 
comment” (See Figure 2). The international media heavily critiqued China for issuing this sort of 
gag order on the media. However, this sort of directive is very common for the Chinese 
government and the Chinese media, as was observed by China Digital Times (See Figure 2). 
Now, it is highly relevant that the government chose to restrict the general print and TV 
media immediately, but not micro-bloggers. Micro-bloggers, representing the netizens of China, 
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present the primary audience of the discourse that the Chinese government must frame, and they 
are the ones who must be manipulated successfully by the discourse. The Chinese media, on the 
other hand, has two roles: it is either means for the government to give its narrative, its side of 
the story, its version of the discourse, or, the media has an independent voice, and independent 
frame on the discourse. In either case, the media isn’t the central issue; the micro-bloggers and 
netizens are. In terms of propagation power, the media has a louder voice than a single, 
anonymous blogger; thus, in terms of discourse analysis, the media has more power to alter the 
discourse on the Wenzhou train crash in ways the government would dislike. In short, the 
government can use a micro-blogger’s opinion, take note of its message, and delete it, and in all 
likelihood, its absence from the internet will go unmarked. Thousands of tweets about the crash 
were censored, and the international media only preserved a scant few, hence there are only four 
examples in Figure 4. The Chinese news media, on the other hand, is disseminated, cited by 
other news sources, and leaves an impression on the discourse that is much harder to erase. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the CCP ultimately controls CCTV, Xinhua, and most 
major news media sources. Typically, when the government needs to speak, it can count on these 
media sources to say what the government wants, how it wants it to be stated. For this reason, the 
Chinese government immediately cracked down on the national media agencies, shaping its 
dialogue. The news media later began to pull away from the strictures of the government 
directives, but still, the news reports from the Chinese media shy away from the aggressive 
language of the international news media. The Western media is not afraid of directly 
confronting the Chinese government for failure. Indeed it took the Chinese media until August 
4th to even publish that there had been flaws in the train design (the international news media 
starting making claims to such flaws starting as early as July 26th). 
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The surveillance model is also echoed in two elements of the Chinese government’s 
reaction: the separation of dissenting opinions through censorship and declaration of words to be 
left unspoken, and the turning of the memes in the government’s favor, which the civilians then 
assimilate into their discourse. In this example, the Chinese government has succeeded in both 
areas. First, the government watched to see what the main complaints were. They then responded 
to those complaints concerning accountability. Second, dissenters, or those whose discussions on 
microblogs questioned the Chinese railway projects or Chinese modernity, had their comments 
removed, as reflected in the data charts. Other microbloggers, aware that these blog posts were 
being removed (See Figure 4), know that if they comment in ways that the government finds 
offensive that they too will be censored, or perhaps even punished directly by the Chinese 
government. As such, people follow only the narratives that the government has established as 
“safe”. These discourses focus on how the government still hasn’t published the reports they 
promised about what went wrong on the railways on July 23rd. When the government does 
publish a report, which will likely address blogger concerns, this report will then go on to shape 
the future discourse. In this way, the government has a high amount of the control of the 
discussion, from here on out. Thus, in three steps, the government first watched, then separated 
dissenting opinions, and then created the norm for the netizens to use for their self-regulating, 
normalizing behavior. 
Overall, the Wenzhou train crash reveals that the Chinese government actively allowed 
people to speak about the Wenzhou train crash, despite how badly it reflects on the Chinese 
government, because their voices are useful to feed China’s surveillance model of Internet 
governance. This crash is still reverberating throughout Internet forums in China. In a country 
where most citizens use high-speed rail as a means of transit, the safety of this means of 
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transportation is paramount. Yet, people still continue to use the railways, and no one has moved 
to unseat the government for not providing sufficiently safe public transit. In other words, the 
Chinese government has preserved its mandate to rule, has created the image that it is still 
upholding its social contract. Thus, not only is China using the surveillance model, it is using it 
and will continue to use it effectively as a means of framing public discourse and shaping 
historical and political narratives. More broadly, this study shows how an authoritarian regime, 
instead of simply silencing dissent, appropriated the discourse of citizens to further its personal 
agenda and reinforce regime stability, instead of allowing the speech to confound government 
goals as dissenters had intended. 
 
Chapter 3: US Case Study 
How the Internet Stopped the Stop Online Piracy Act: US Case Study 
 At the heart of regime stability is economic progress. The Wenzhou train crash proved 
that economic progress is a central narrative, a meme, upon which much of government 
discourse is built. It is clear why this meme is common between governments; from a thriving 
economy comes jobs, and from jobs come the basic necessities for survival. On first blush, when 
looking at the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), introduced to the US Congress by Representative 
Lamar Smith of Texas on October 26, 2011, and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) in the United States and the European Union, it would seem that these legislations and 
agreements merely concern copyright abuse. However, at the heart of these conflicts are losses of 
jobs due to pirating information, on the one hand, and freedom of speech, on the other. Both 
sides of the SOPA and ACTA debates are concerned with issues at the heart of regime stability, 
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specifically economic progress and the rule of law, and the EU and US must control the 
discourse surrounding copyright infringement through manipulation, propagation, and memes, as 
defined by discourse theory, in order to achieve their long-term goals of intellectual property 
protection. These cases are both examples of how these two regime types, a democratic republic 
and a supranational authority, utilize citizens’ freedom of speech to forward government 
initiatives, instead of just responding to citizen demands. These cases illustrate that freedom of 
speech does not always empower the citizen over the government, but that sometimes the reverse 
effect occurs. 
 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET IN THE WEST 
 When considering the role of the United States government in the Internet, it is critical to 
remember that without the US government, the Internet would not exist in its current form. 
Tracing the Internet back to its origins, the Internet began humbly, with academics publishing 
papers in the early 1960s on “Information Flow in Large Communication Nets" (Kleinrock) and 
slowly developing the network components necessary for the leap to Internet technology. While 
the components for creating the Internet slowly came into academia, the pressures of the Cold 
War on the United States created a necessity for a system of communication that could withstand 
nuclear holocaust. The newly-created Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 
developed in 1958 by the US government in response to Russia’s Sputnik launch and display of 
superior technological advancement (Kleinrock), was determined to create such a network.  
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In pursuit of this goal, US government contacted engineers and scientists working on data 
network theory such as Paul Baran, researcher at the RAND Corporation, and Leonard Kleinrock, 
professor at UCLA, to design this new system. ARPA then provided funding for these 
researchers to develop the ARPANET, “a government-supported data network” (Kleinrock). In 
1969, ARPANET was first put to the test, with the first node of ARPANET installed at UCLA 
and the seventh node at the RAND Institute in Santa Monica (Kleinrock).  In 1983, ARPANET 
divided into MILNET, the military component of the network, and the second version of 
ARPANET, which consisted of non-military-related data networks. In 1989, the ARPANET title 
was updated to more accurately reflect this versatile new network. The moniker given was "the 
Internet," and the name stuck. 
Currently, the Internet has become an immensely influential force in American society 
and indeed the world. According to Pew Research, “fully 95% of all teens ages 12-17 are now 
online and 80% of those online teens are users of social media sites.” Essentially, nearly every 
teenager in America is being raised with the Internet as a primary media source (Lenhart). The 
rich also have increasing access to the Internet; “95% of those in households earning over 
$75,000 use the internet and cell phones” (Jansen). Of the overall American population, as of 
2008, Nielsen reports that “Overall, 80.6% of homes in Nielsen’s National People Meter panel 
have a computer (either desktop or laptop) in their homes as of mid-November, 2008.” Of those 
with personal computers, 91.6% have “some sort of internet connection” ("An Overview of 
Home Internet Access in the U.S."). This data suggests that the Internet has become a very 
important medium of receiving and exchanging information in American households. Especially 
among the American youth, the Internet is becoming a predominant means of communication, 
information dissemination and collection. 
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Americans using the internet are not passively receiving information; the Internet is 
becoming the community of the 21st century. According to Nielsen, “today nearly 4 in 5 active 
Internet users visit social networks and blogs,” and “Americans spend more time on Facebook 
than they do on any other U.S. website” ("State of the Media: Social Media Report"). Social 
networking sites are designed for sharing personal information, beliefs, and social commentary 
with others in the network. As Nielsen affirms, of these adults using social networking sites, they 
are “26% more likely to give their opinion on politics and current events” compared to their 
peers who did not use social networking sites. In other words, social networking in the Internet 
age is correlated with increasing awareness and promotion of political discourses. 
 The EU and the US must grapple with dissent in public discourse in this new medium, 
just as the Chinese government must. While the Chinese government chooses particular modes 
of censorship, the US and the EU implement different methods of social and political coercion to 
achieve their ends. In this chapter, the focus will be on the US’s method of controlling freedom 
of speech through managing the discourse on the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) with 
manipulations, and on the US’s government’s ability to manufacture consent through drafting 
and redrafting of legislation. 
 In the United States, out of many possible cases, this thesis writer chose to study SOPA 
because it shows how citizens and US corporations galvanized around the issue of online piracy, 
creating a cohesive alternative narrative to the US government’s discourse. Citizens in the 21st 
century have become used to a high degree of freedom in the Internet sphere. As technology has 
developed further and more content becomes available online, finding illegally uploaded movies 
and music online is just a click or two away. Used to this ease of access, citizens fought back 
when the government prioritized changing this unsustainable content-stealing culture that has 
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developed, a culture that deprives movie production studios of profit and threatens the strength 
of the movie industry. US law dictates that this infringement is illegal, and while citizens have 
become adjusted to illegal online downloads, the government is now seeking to change that 
culture. However, SOPA became much more than a simple debate on online piracy; the 
discourse became intertwined with the future of US governance of freedom of speech on the 
internet, and on the basis of fearing censorship, the US citizens convinced the US House of 
Representatives to remove the act from debate. The puzzle is that the act is in the process of 
being redrafted. This case examines how and why the government decided to ignore citizen 
complaints and continued to pursue its agenda through discourse manipulation. 
First, it is important to understand the governments’ representatives’ motives behind the 
SOPA project. The government representatives made SOPA a priority because of the growing 
pressure from private corporations to strengthen US copyright protections online. In the Internet 
age, upholding this system is an entirely different process than before the digital era. In the era of 
newsprint and vinyl, trying to copy books and music or other forms of creative content under 
copyright protect was an involved process; one had to duplicate thousands of hard copies, 
requiring a major time investment and money expenditure. With computers and digital files, the 
same process of copying information occurs in seconds, with a simple click of a mouse. With the 
advent of the Internet came this ability to share information and content that is under copyright, 
and suddenly those copyrights became harder to protect and enforce. The Stop Online Piracy Act 
was as an attempt to maintain control over infringement of intellectual property (IP) rights. 
 The SOPA case allows for a deeper exploration of how the US government and its 
representatives manage discourse on the Internet. Twitter became a fighting ground for winning 
public opinion on SOPA, and as such, Congressmen and Congresswomen in the US House of 
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Representatives took to Twitter to voice their opinions on the bill. Twitter allowed the 
government to see exactly what aspects of SOPA concerned citizens, and many representatives 
attempted to address these concerns. Ultimately, the representatives in favor of SOPA lost 
support for the bill, both in the House and in the public eye.  
The key question is why did SOPA fail to pass in the House? There have been multiple 
reasons given, in the media and over Twitter, for why SOPA failed. One reason commonly cited 
is that SOPA itself was not a well-worded piece of legislation. The bill was intentionally unclear 
in certain areas, including Section 103, which called for any websites “enabling or facilitating” 
copyright infringement to be shut down. Taken to the extreme, this section could be interpreted 
to mean that even if only one person on Facebook, for example, posts a link to a site with 
copyright-infringed content, all of Facebook would be liable to be shut down. The ambiguity in 
the text led to loss of support from most Internet-based companies, especially those functioning 
in the realm of social media, as their Internet sites were left vulnerable and the companies feared 
profit losses if the law passed. There is a solid case to be made that the bill was simply poorly 
worded. 
However, on a more theoretical level, this case study shows through discourse analysis 
that the reason the act failed was because Internet companies had the upper hand on propagation. 
Propagation, the ability to spread a discourse to the maximum amount of people quickly, was the 
key element of discourse in the case of SOPA. The companies and representatives in favor of 
SOPA had excellent tools of manipulation and meme implementation; however, the Internet-
based firms had a wider audience, one they called upon to stop SOPA through manipulation and 
memes of their own. The distinguishing factor was that the Internet sites’ manipulations and 
memes in the discourse were heard by more people. 
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This case study will focus on four discourses in the SOPA debate, those of the US 
government representatives for and against SOPA, media corporations with vested interests in 
seeing SOPA come to fruition, internet corporations with vested interests opposing SOPA, and 
the voice of the American public on the Internet as seen through web comments on Twitter, and 
online newspapers publishing articles on SOPA. In order to reconstruct the discourse, this case 
will first review the text of SOPA as it was proposed. Second, the Internet and old media 
companies’ response to SOPA will show how the corporate world reframed the discourse, 
examining the visual rhetoric from both sides the day before SOPA was debated in the House of 
Representatives. Third, the citizen responses from Twitter show how the American public 
engaged with the discourse, primarily perpetuating the manipulations and memes of either side 
of the discourse. Finally, the US public officials’ Twitter posts show how the government 
watched the public reaction to SOPA and then decided to withdraw their support for the bill as 
protests continued.  
THE TEXT OF THE STOP ONLINE PIRACY ACT 
  The text of the Stop Online Piracy Act clearly delineates the desire for Congress to 
actively intervene in stopping online piracy, and is not inherently designed to hinder freedom of 
speech. The second section of the bill actually explicitly states this principle: “Nothing in this 
Act shall be construed to impose a prior restraint on free speech or the press protected under the 
1st amendment to the Constitution” (“Stop Online Piracy Act” 2). Prior restraint is a legal term, 
and prior restraint is illegal in the United States and under English Common Law. In essence, 
outlawing prior restraint prohibits governments from banning expression of ideas prior to their 
publication ("Prior Restraint"). The Chinese government’s censorship lists are examples of prior 
restraint. Clearly, the US government did not employ rhetoric supporting infringement on 
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freedom of speech in SOPA, because it would be illegal. Thus, most of the later allegations on 
the act’s “intentions” to destroy freedom of speech are not founded in any part of the actual act. 
 However, there are sections of the act that have fueled the SOPA controversy, 
particularly Section 103. This section defines those who have infringed upon copyrights. The 
wording leaves some ambiguity. 
(1) DEDICATED TO THEFT OF U.S. PROPERTY.—An ‘‘Internet site is 
dedicated to theft of  U.S. property’’ if— (A) it is an Internet site, or a portion 
thereof, that is a U.S.-directed site and is used by users within the United 
States; and (B) either— (i) the U.S.-directed site is primarily designed or 
operated for the purpose of, has only limited purpose or use other than, or is 
marketed by its operator or another acting in concert with that operator for use 
in, offering goods or services in a manner that engages in, enables, or 
facilitates… (“Stop Online Piracy Act 25) 
 The section goes on to describe, essentially, foreign sites that steal copyrighted 
information. The key part of the definition that has Internet companies panicking is “facilitates.” 
This definition is very loose, allowing for courts to accuse a wide array of Internet sites of 
copyright infringement. The government’s rhetoric started the discourse, setting the tone of 
foreign sites versus US enterprises, in an act that seeks to protect copyrights while upholding free 
speech. 
THE CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE ON SOPA 
 First came the government’s initial manipulation of the discourse through drafting SOPA; 
then the discourse underwent manipulations from the arguments between old and new media.  To 
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exemplify this debate, the PBS NewsHour of Jan. 17, 2012, brought in corporate representations 
of both Internet and old media corporations. On the Internet side of the debate, there was Ben 
Huh, CEO of Cheezburger, a very popular website that displays comedic content of funny cats, 
videos of people making mistakes, the sort of site that benefits from visitors procrastinating on 
more important tasks. On the old media corporation side was Rick Cotton of NBCUniversal, 
executive vice president and general counsel. As the NBCUniversal corporate page helpfully 
notes, he “supervises the NBCUniversal Law Department, which provides legal advice to all 
NBCUniversal business units for their ongoing operations and for new strategic plans and 
acquisitions” ("NBCUniversal-Rick Cotton"). These two corporate chiefs represent the Internet 
and “old media” sides of the SOPA debate, respectively, and their responses to each other follow 
old and new media’s respective discourses on SOPA very closely. 
Ben Huh’s responses followed the pre-scripted discourse of the Internet corporations 
perfectly. He told PBS that he is opposed to SOPA because the legislation will “curb first 
amendment rights on the internet and prohibit growth of American jobs in the US sector” (“A 
World Without Wikipedia”). These are the two major areas of manipulation that the Internet 
corporations employed in the SOPA debate: free speech and jobs. On the free speech point, Huh 
duly observes that there is a Fair Use clause involved in the law surrounding copyrighted 
material. According to Cornell University’s Legal Information Institute the Fair Use limitation 
on copyright protections reads as follows:  “the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such 
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright” (17 USC. Sec. 107). 
Mr. Huh feels that SOPA violates the Fair Use clause, as websites who mock copyrighted 
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material (his site is an example of such websites) could be unfairly persecuted for violating 
copyrighted material. Moreover, he feels the lobbyists Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA) and Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) are specifically abusing the 
fair use of copyrighted material, as they are well known proponents of the legislation. Ben Huh 
summarizes the Internet company perspective as follows: “We are in support of bills that curb 
piracy and counterfeiting if it does not infringe on our first amendment rights, does not lower our 
standing in the international community by preventing people from using censorship tools, as 
well as protecting American jobs” (“A World Without Wikipedia”). The irony here, of course, is 
that his statement aligns directly with what SOPA wants to achieve, according to the act itself.  
On the other side of the debate stands Rick Cotton. NBCUniversal supports SOPA 
because “what is at stake are the jobs of millions of Americans.” His claims are that the 
entertainment industry is “under assault,” that these foreign sites are “trafficking in stolen 
content,” and that the bill is about foreign websites, not about fair use. He notes that only court 
orders with “full due process” will allow sites to be shut down, and that there is “no lack of 
clarity” in how bill is written. Overall, Cotton’s main theme is that “protecting the internet 
requires that it be under the rule of law” (“A World Without Wikipedia”). 
Here, the memes and manipulations of both sides of the corporate argumentation become 
clear. On the anti-SOPA side, Internet corporations use underlying concerns about censorship 
and loss of freedom of speech as an important meme, using rhetoric than manipulates the listener 
into fearing these subconscious issues. On the pro-SOPA side, old media is focusing on memes 
like “job loss” and “foreign invasion by international illegal content sharers” and “competition”. 
On the anti-SOPA side, words like “infringe,” “censorship,” and invoking “first amendment 
rights” evoke the desired memes, whereas the pro-SOPA side employs language like 
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“trafficking,” “rule of law,” and “under assault” to manipulate the listener into remembering 
memes like nationalism and government control. 
From this rhetorical basis comes the majority of the discourse surrounding SOPA on the 
public opinion level. As Khan Academy, a website that offers free academic tutorials, explained 
it in a Youtube video for the public, they also largely object to Section 103 of SOPA, specifically 
the “enables or facilitates” portion. They note that user boards create issues for Facebook, 
Youtube, CNN.com, anyone with a message board that could link to illegal sites outside the US. 
Moreover, this section makes any action to “avoid confirming” piracy illegal, thus making any 
obfuscation of company actions illegal; in other words, this section would remove all privacy of 
company actions on the internet (“SOPA and PIPA”). Khan Academy is a non-profit, and while it 
does have stakes in the Internet corporation side of the issue, it is also generally non-partisan on 
these types of issues. 
Both liberals and conservatives began to have misgivings about SOPA. The National Review 
writer Nathaniel Botwinick, known for his conservative bent, agreed with the Khan Academy in 
his November 30, 2011 article.  He observes that “’facilitation’” is the dangerous word in the 
targeting criteria. Facebook, Tumblr, and dozens of other popular websites could be accused of 
‘facilitating’ the spread of pirated material if one of their members happens to post a copyrighted 
movie or song” (Botwinick). He also notes that the repercussions on the Internet companies 
would be severe: “Under SOPA, Internet service providers would be required to block access to 
websites the DOJ deems guilty of such activity.” Botwinick also notes that “the driving industry 
behind SOPA is the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA).” The MPAA, being one of 
the behemoths of old media, obviously has stakes against copyright infringement.  Michael 
O’Leary, vice president of the MPAA, has been quoted by Botwinick as saying that “millions of 
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Americans associated with the production of movies in America would lose their jobs” if current 
copyright infringement issues continue. Overall, Botwinick concludes that the MPAA has 
created impetus behind a flawed bill that should not pass. 
 These actors created the verbal discourse surrounding SOPA in the months preceding the US 
House of Representatives’ debate on the act. In the rhetorical battle for discourse control, there 
was not necessarily a clear winner. It was in the battle for visual rhetoric and in protest that the 
Internet corporations gained an upper hand. The day before the House debates, Internet 
corporations staged a united “black-out protest” of their websites, meaning that users could not 
access some content on the webpages of participating companies, or that the websites posted 
anti-SOPA messages for the entire day before the debates began. It was this protest, performed 
using visual and verbal rhetoric, which swayed the discourse against SOPA. 
THE SOPA BLACKOUT: CORPORATIONS’ VISUAL RHETORIC IN THE SOPA 
DISCOURSE 
 One way in which the corporations against SOPA dominated the discourse debate 
successfully was through superior visual rhetoric. On January 18, 2012, the day that SOPA was 
to be debated in the House of Representatives, some of the largest and most successful Internet 
firms performed a “blackout” of their content. Some websites, like Wikipedia, blocked their 
content such that users could not access any parts of the site. Others, like Google, implemented a 
splash page that forced users, before accessing the website’s contents, to see a “Stop 
SOPA/PIPA” message, encouraging the user to speak out against the legislation. 
 
59 
 
 
Figure 1: Wired SOPA Blackout Page 
Screenshot 
(Scalera)
 
Figure 3: BoingBoing.com SOPA Blackout 
Page Screenshot (Scalera)
 
Figure 2: CraigsList SOPA Blackout Page 
Screenshot (Scalera) 
 
Figure 4: WordPress SOPA Blackout Page 
Screenshot (Scalera) 
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Figure 5: OReilly Media SOPA Blackout 
Page Screenshot (Scalera) 
 
Figure 6: Wikipedia SOPA Blackout Page 
Screenshot 
(Scalera)
 
Figure 7: Mozilla Firefox SOPA Blackout 
Page Screenshot (Scalera) 
 
Figure 8: Google Search Page & Logo 
SOPA Blackout Page Screenshot (Scalera) 
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Figure 9: Reddit SOPA Blackout Page 
Screenshot (Scalera)
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 The above images represent a selection of nine of the blackout page visuals from nine of 
the Internet’s highest volume sites. The visual rhetoric is clearly designed to be similar. Every 
single one uses a black and white color scheme, designed to represent the “blackout,” while also 
setting the serious tone necessary to impress the severity of the situation on the audience. Seven 
of the nine use all-black pages to completely block all visual access to content and use white text 
describing next actions for users. The other two black out sentences (See Figure 1) or the website 
title (See Figure 8). Two of the nine offer links to clips that are anti-SOPA/PIPA, and every 
single one offers to help the user contact a government representative. The Google blackout site 
is the least specific about further steps for the user; however, by simply clicking on the blacked 
out Google logo, the user was brought to a search results page containing search results for anti-
SOPA/PIPA sites. From the visual rhetoric present, it is apparent that the Internet companies’ 
manipulation had three intended effects: to remove content for a day, to show the user what “a 
world under SOPA” would look like both visually and through the absence of content, all to 
create the desire to oppose SOPA. All of this is from the visuals. 
 Of course, the corporations in favor of SOPA also implemented visual rhetoric to 
convince the American public to support SOPA and to counteract the Internet company 
blackouts. MSNBC aired a pro-SOPA commercial during the Chris Matthews show on January 
18, 2012, the same day Congress started debating SOPA, and the same day as the Internet 
blackouts. This thirty second commercial had the following transcript: 
 
American ideas, they shine through a thousand new products, software, and 
movies, creating millions of new jobs. But now American creativity and 
innovation are under attack. Everyday foreign criminals use illegal websites to 
steal American products, steal our ideas, and put Americans out of work. It’s time 
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for a new idea. Tell Congress to Stop Online Piracy. (“MSNBC 
CreativeAmerica.org SOPA Ad Original.”) 
 This commercial visually presented a light bulb against a black background, which when 
lit, glowed with the American flag. As the discussion of foreign criminals began, the lightbulb 
exploded, and the flag vanished, to signify the death of American ideas and jobs. The visual 
rhetoric here is not unlike those of the blackout pages; the color scheme is dark, and the wording 
is designed to mirror the loss of the lightbulb, a meme of knowledge and ideas, and the American 
flag, a meme for nationalism. This ad is meant to stimulate feelings of nationalism and play upon 
fears of unemployment in a difficult economic climate. 
THE CITIZEN RESPONSE TO SOPA 
 The American citizen is not a passive recipient of discourse. Recall Foucault’s statement 
in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, that “discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or 
raised up against it, any more than silences are…discourse can be both an instrument and an 
effect of power, but also a hindrance…a starting point for an opposing strategy” (Foucault, 
History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 101). Just as the Internet an old media corporations created an 
opposition strategy to the SOPA legislation, the American people began to side with one side or 
the other based on personal motivations. 
 In the course of SOPA, Twitter became the propagation platform for civilian discourse. 
From November 16, 2011 to April 8th, 2012, Twitter micro-bloggers posted approximately 
139,194 tweets with the hash tag #SOPA, indicating that they were commenting on the SOPA 
debate ("Archive on #SOPA"). Of these posts, 64.52% were original tweets (posts) on the SOPA 
issue, while 35.48% were retweets (reposts) on the topic. The majority of these reposts were to 
spread petitions against SOPA, using Twitter to propagate the anti-SOPA perspective of the 
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discourse. A sampling of the Twitter postings elucidates the evolution of the discourse 
throughout the SOPA blackout protests, and how these protests impacted public opinion. When 
examining citizen Twitter posts for propagation, manipulation, and memes, it becomes clear that 
the citizens had some faculty in implementing propagation and manipulations, but had no unified 
message or intentional memes behind their discourse. As such, they were less effective in 
establishing one, solid discourse, and instead created an amalgamation of dissenting voices 
against SOPA. 
Figure 10: Citizen Twitter Posts 
Date Name Comment Text Number 
of 
Retweets 
Numbe
r of 
Favorit
es 
Link to 
Webpag
e 
Side of 
Discours
e 
Jan. 
17, 
2012 
Pour Me 
Coffee3 
If you are staying up to 
see Wikipedia go black, 
your mother and I are 
very worried about you. 
50+ 12 No Non-
specific 
Januar
y 17, 
2012 
Gokhan 
Karatay4 
 
I really do hope #SOPA 
and #PIPA bills aren't 
passed through the 
senate. Legislation 
against piracy is needed, 
but that really isn't the 
way 
 
1 0 No Anti-
SOPA 
Januar
y 17, 
2012 
Cory 
Doctorow5 
MPAA says #SOPA 
blackout is "an abuse of 
market power," what 
about having non-
skippable fake FBI 
warnings & biased PSAs 
before every DVD? 
50+ 50+ No Anti-
SOPA 
Januar
y 18, 
Eben 
Rawluk6 
#SOPA "To promote 
prosperity, creativity, 
0 0 No Anti-
SOPA 
                                               
3
 https://twitter.com/#!/pourmecoffee/status/159480004999258112 
4
 https://twitter.com/#!/GokhanKaratay/statuses/159541790867853313 
5
 https://twitter.com/#!/doctorow/statuses/159508829531410432 
6
 https://twitter.com/#!/Eben_Rawluk/statuses/159690573987581952 
65 
 
2012 entrepreneurship, and 
innovation by combating 
the theft of U.S. 
property" Hmmm... 
Januar
y 18, 
2012 
Jess Drew7 #sopa props to 
@Wikipedia @wired 
@craignewmark 
@craigslist @google - 
#nicejob 
1 1 No Anti-
SOPA 
Januar
y 18, 
2012 
Kevin V.8 If #SOPA is passed, our 
internet will become like 
China's internet. 
Websites will be 
deleted/blocked in favor 
of the Governments 
benefit. 
3 0 No Anti-
SOPA 
Januar
y 18, 
2012 
Sorin 
Stefan9 
Maybe #sopa guys had 
good intentions, it's just 
that they dont know how 
Internetz works, like 
most suits these days 
0 0 No Anti-
SOPA 
Feb. 6, 
2012 
Wendy 
Seltzer10 
NYT's Bill Keller misses 
point of #SOPA / #PIPA 
opposition: Don't reshape 
Internet infrastructure for 
(c) enforcement 
http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/06/opinion/steal-
this-
column.html?_r=1&hpw
=&pagewanted=all 
5 2 Yes Anti-
SOPA 
Feb. 
16, 
2012 
Andrea11 @Linkara19 
BREAKING: #SOPA is 
back. Now [unofficially] 
called the "Cyber 
Security Terrorism Act" 
(CSTA, Cista). Will 
include kill switch. 
50+ 2 No Anti-
SOPA 
April 7, 
2012 
Joe 
Trippi12 
Ouch. Day after Chris 
Dodd says he's 
18 3 Yes Pro-
SOPA 
                                               
7
 https://twitter.com/#!/jessdrew/statuses/159676643496038401 
8
 https://twitter.com/#!/Kevinho360/status/159790056276623360 
9
 https://twitter.com/#!/sorinstefan/statuses/159631660650987520 
10
 https://twitter.com/#!/wseltzer/statuses/166528018540527617 
11
 https://twitter.com/#!/Nahima20/statuses/170285621187842048 
12
 https://twitter.com/#!/JoeTrippi/status/188661996688916480 
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"confidant" of #SOPA 
revival, MPAA's fmr tech 
policy chief comes out 
against it. 
http://news.cnet.com/830
1-31921_3-57410674-
281/mpaas-former-tech-
policy-chief-turns-sopa-
foe/ 
 
Propagation 
 Citizens using Twitter, by definition, have audiences to whom they are speaking, and thus 
they are propagating a message. Given that citizens have varying backgrounds and political 
believes, this set of tweets does not necessarily represent a cohesive discourse against the 
government. For example, Andrea’s post on the “return of SOPA” is against SOPA inherently, as 
are the majority of the civilian posts online. However, Pour Me Coffee’s comment on SOPA, re-
tweeted by the MPAA, is more neutral in tone. Given that these individuals have varying 
audience sizes, some receive more propagation of their message than others. Cory Doctorow’s 
comment on SOPA, “MPAA says #SOPA blackout is "an abuse of market power," what about 
having non-skippable fake FBI warnings & biased PSAs before every DVD?” has the most 
retweets and favorites of any comment, but Doctorow is also a professional blogger, giving him 
a readership and more experience posting tweets than most other citizens in the figure above. 
This disunity of the discourse, with different citizens spreading different messages, and the 
disparity between which tweets have the largest audience, means that there is not an even 
propagation of a unified discourse in the population. However, the majority of tweets examined 
give SOPA a negative manipulation, meaning that, taken as a whole, the citizens’ discourse on 
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SOPA is inherently negative, although the reasons for disliking the act vary from free speech 
issues to dislike of the MPAA and major media corporations. 
Manipulation 
 The exaggeration of claims is the most frequent manipulation of the citizens. Allegations 
of “biased PSAs,” “suits” who do not understand the Internet, and excitement over the success of 
the blackouts are all rhetorical ways of manipulating the SOPA discourse away from the 
government narrative. The government representatives who drafted SOPA designed it to protect 
private industry. The “biased PSAS” comment attacks the private industry’s legitimacy in asking 
for SOPA to be passed, hitting at the heart of the government discourse. Moreover, the 
allegations that the government does not understand the Internet seeks to return power to the 
citizens, who are implied to understand the Internet better than the government. The support of 
the blackouts supports the Internet media’s narrative over that of the government’s, thus altering 
the discourse by emphasizing one discourse over another. The issue, however, with exaggeration 
as a manipulation tactic is that it is easily turned by the government. Since the civilian population 
is not thinking collectively about more profound ways of confounding the government discourse, 
the government in this respect has the upper hand, as it has the ability to speak with one voice 
and have one cohesive manipulation strategy. Simply siding with one discourse over another, or 
taking different stabs at the government from different angles, is not sufficient for the people to 
commandeer the discourse from the government’s control. 
Memes 
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 There are no cohesive memes mentioned by the people. Instead, what the tweets reflect 
are haphazard criticisms that skim the surface, rarely getting to the memetic level. This absence 
of memes also gives government officials the upper hand. 
 Looking at the Twitter posts of public figures, two facts become clear. First, as the citizen 
and corporate voices began to win the discourse, representatives who were in favor of the 
legislation originally changed sides after the blackouts. Second, the government had to clearly 
distinct discourses on SOPA, one side in favor, one side against, and these discourse had a more 
cohesive message that the citizen discourse. 
Figure 11: Public Official Twitter Posts 
Dat
e 
Name and 
Position 
Comment Text Number 
of 
Retweet
s 
Number 
of 
Favorite
s 
Link to 
Webpag
e 
Side of 
Discours
e 
Jan. 
13, 
201
2 
Lamar Smith, 
Representative 
for Texas13 
Read my release here on 
my decision to remove 
DNS blocking from 
SOPA. 
50+ 16 Yes-Link 
now 
removed 
Pro-
SOPA 
Jan. 
18, 
201
2 
Nancy Pelosi, 
Minority 
Leader of the 
United States 
House of 
Representative
s 14 
Your #SOPA tweets are 
important to help 
Congress strike a better 
balance between 
protecting intellectual 
property & internet 
freedom. 
50+ 23 No Non-
specific 
Jan. 
18, 
201
2 
Niki Tsongas, 
Representative 
for 
Massachusetts 
15
 
I oppose #SOPA. It is 
written too broadly and 
could have an adverse 
affect [sic] on free speech 
and internet innovation. 
36 9 No Anti-
SOPA 
Jan. 
18, 
201
Ron Paul, 
Representative 
for Texas16 
The internet must remain 
free! Proud to see so 
many taking a stand 
50+ 50+ No Anti-
SOPA 
                                               
13
 https://twitter.com/#!/LamarSmithTX21/status/157945420453134336 
14
 https://twitter.com/#!/NancyPelosi/statuses/159788474713640961 
15
 https://twitter.com/#!/nikiinthehouse/statuses/159685653293043713 
16
 https://twitter.com/#!/RonPaul/status/159747334174019584 
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2 today. Oppose #SOPA 
and #PIPA! #tcot #tlot 
#GOP2012 
Jan. 
19, 
201
2 
Dennis Ross, 
Representative 
for 
California17 
One thing missed in 
yesterday's SOPA debate 
was that Cognress [sic] 
(without my support) put 
our nation another $1.2 
trillion in debt. 
4 0 No Pro-
SOPA 
Jan.  
23, 
201
2 
Dennis Ross, 
Representative 
for 
California18 
For those who want to 
know, I have, as of about 
5 minutes ago, officially 
removed my name from 
#SOPA. Had to wait till 
we were in session. 
12 2 No Anti-
SOPA 
Feb. 
6, 
201
2 
Ron Wyden, 
US Senator for 
Oregon 19 
#PIPA, #SOPA protests 
showed the public 
deserves a seat at the 
table & Congress needs a 
truly open process 
19 0 No Non-
specific 
Dec. 
9, 
201
2 
Elton 
Gallegly, 
Representative 
for 
California20 
To stop foreign 
counterfeiters and protect 
consumers, I support the 
Stop Online Piracy Act 
http://tinyurl.com/c5nwa
p5 
3 1 Yes Pro-
SOPA 
 
Propagation 
 In general, the government representatives receive more retweets than the civilians. The 
significance of the “retweet” is that a Twitter tweet that is retweeted is now posted on another 
person’s account, meaning that comment receives a wider audience than if it was just on the 
poster’s Twitter feed. Thus, the government officials, having larger audiences due to their public 
roles and social status, not only have wider audiences privy to their Twitter feeds, they also get 
more audience members propagating their message for them. In this fashion, the government 
                                               
17
 https://twitter.com/#!/RepDennisRoss/status/160030548755095553 
18
 https://twitter.com/#!/RepDennisRoss/status/161602679167135744 
19
 https://twitter.com/#!/RonWyden/statuses/166616305250742272 
20
 https://twitter.com/#!/eltongallegly24/status/145270827745673217 
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officials are able to spread their discourse father and more quickly than civilians, giving the 
government an edge in controlling the discourse surrounding SOPA. 
Manipulation 
 The government officials do not have a consistent stance on SOPA, either. A large reason 
for the diversity of opinion has to do with the negative stances taken by citizens and Internet 
corporations against SOPA. In this sense, the Internet corporations and the citizens managed to 
redirect the discourse enough to gain support of those who formerly dissented. The key 
manipulations of those still in favor of the legislation was claims to economic protection for 
citizens, with tweets like “To stop foreign counterfeiters and protect consumers” and noting the 
amount of profits lost due to copyright infringement. However, the responses by those in favor of 
SOPA never touched on the freedom of speech issue brought up by the Internet corporations. 
This could be one reason why SOPA failed, was the government’s inability to adapt the 
discourse to reframe citizen and corporate concerns. 
Memes 
 Economic issues became the main meme of the government discourse in favor of SOPA< 
while those against took up the Internet corporation meme of freedom. Those in favor focused on 
the economic arguments for SOPA, citing profit losses for citizens. The trouble with this meme, 
however, was that it wasn’t very persuasive. It focused on profits of corporations, while not 
addressing the key concerns of the opposition. In the meantime, representatives against SOPA 
focused on aligning with the Internet corporations; thus their memes reflect this choice. From 
Ron Paul’s statement that “the internet must remain free” to Tsongas “It is written too broadly 
and could have an adverse affect [sic] on free speech and internet innovation,” these statements 
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focus on the freedom of speech issue over economic values, aligning themselves with the 
Internet side. 
 These representatives were wise to align with the Internet corporations. After the 
blackout, during which an estimated 115,000 websites and 14 million users participated, the US 
public opinion had spoken through Facebook and Twitter commentary, boycotting of the internet 
and signing of petitions on We the People, the White House petition Internet forum21. The US 
House of Representatives pulled SOPA from the floor after the online protests, and the Internet 
companies and citizens against SOPA declared victory. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SOPA’S FAILURE 
 SOPA did not pass into law. However, the act is not yet dead. The government has the 
ability to redraft legislation and re-submit it for voting. Indeed, as one tweet noted from civilian 
Andrea, the new Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) legislation has 
overtones similar to SOPA. The distinction, however, is that CISPA is framed as an anti-
terrorism bill. Since CISPA seeks to target foreign governments and actors attacking Internet 
sites, the Internet corporations are in favor of the legislation, making the political alignment 
different than before. Moreover, there are clauses of CISPA that relate also to protecting IP 
infringement. Essentially, CISPA pleases both Internet and old media corporations. Given that 
Internet corporations were the true winners of the SOPA blackout, not the citizens, it is likely 
that next time around, the government will succeed in passing the legislation. 
                                               
21
 Petition available for public reference at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/14/obama-
administration-responds-we-people-petitions-sopa-and-online-piracy  
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 Internationally as well, the US government’s work is not done with copyright 
infringement online. ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, is still alive, and it is 
moving forward internationally, with the US included. Chapter 4 will delve into this case in 
greater detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: EU Case Study 
Disagreement on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
73 
 
 
In January 2012, 22 European Union nations signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, a plurilateral agreement between the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea. Immediately after signing the treaty, over 
one hundred protests broke out throughout EU member nations. In the weeks that followed, the 
very representatives who signed the document would reject ACTA’s ability to uphold freedom of 
speech, and even the rapporteur responsible for reviewing ACTA on behalf of the Commission, 
member of the European Parliament Kader Arif, quit his position as reviewer based on the 
agreement’s deleterious effects on free expression in Europe. Yet, ACTA continued through the 
EU government policy process, moving in April to judicial review by the European Court of 
Justice. The question is, in light of the massive amount of public dissent and outcries against the 
agreement, why has ACTA continued to pass government checks, coming closer and closer to 
being integrated into European law? Why has freedom of speech of the people failed to change 
anything in how the EU governments treat act? This case study shows that the EU government 
has used discourse manipulation and governance tactics with ACTA to continue pursuing their 
agenda, despite dissent from the people. 
Internet Governance in the EU 
The European Union’s history with the Internet is not as long as the US’s legacy, but 
Europe was also an early adopter to the Internet. The EU’s stance on internet governance was 
established in large part at the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), held as a series of 
meetings from 2003 to 2005, in which the EU and fellow nations set out the principles for the 
Internet’s architecture and operation and for internet governance ("Internet governance" 2009). 
The WSIS observed that the Internet’s architecture is built largely on the private sector and 
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government support on private sector initiatives. “The private sector has been in the forefront 
since the Internet began. It provides the investment, expertise and entrepreneurial initiative 
which foster innovation. The private sector operates most of the international backbone 
infrastructure, the national cable networks, and provides services that facilitate and manage 
traffic.” From this basic premise comes the EU’s support for corporations seeking to engage in 
business online. The EU sees the role of governments in Internet development as it being 
“important that governments play a more active role in its development process.” After WSIS, 
the EU set forth the following principles for how it plans to govern the Internet: 
1. The core architecture should be respected; 
2. The private sector should retain a leading role; 
3. There should be multi-stakeholder participation; 
4. Governments should participate more actively; 
5. Inclusion should be a basic principle. 
The EU concludes with the following notes: “Internet governance is an absolute priority in 
terms of public policy. The EU has a leading role to play since it includes nearly 19 % of the 
world’s Internet users.” These guidelines, designed to be flexible in nature so as to apply to a 
wide range of issues and to grow with the Internet as it develops, set the precedent for many of 
the EU’s actions regarding the Internet. 
EU Governance and the Social Contract 
 In Chapter 1, it was established that freedom of speech is a desirable right for 
governments to allow because it enhances a government’s ability to communicate and receive 
comments from the people. This communication acts to strengthen the social contract that acts as 
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an underpinning to the legitimacy of a government. The social contract, this mutual benefit 
between powers given by the citizen to the government in exchange for the government 
representing the people, is at the heart of freedom of speech for this reason. Of course, there is 
the presumption here that the government is actually representing citizen interests. 
 The European Union is an experiment in politics, in that it is a form of government never 
before seen, and there are no other governments quite like it in structure. It contains elements of 
a federalist system, with its European Parliament and Court of Justice, and has checks and 
balances between these branches. However, the European Commission has the monopoly on 
origination of legislation, unlike the typical federalist system where the Parliament would have 
this power. More importantly, the EU does not supplant the pre-existing governments of its 
member nations, but its rulings and policies do impact these national governments. Since the 
states maintain their sovereignty under the EU, the system cannot truly be called federalist. The 
EU has been called an international organization similar to the United Nations. Yet, the EU’s 
ability to legislate the member states’ policies shows that member states have ceded some 
aspects of sovereignty to the EU. Other international organizations do not have this power over 
their member nations. The EU, for this reason that it is part-federalist, part-international 
organization, is often referred to as a supranational authority. 
 Since the EU has a unique governmental structure, it also has a complicated social 
contract with citizens of the member states. Citizens have power in the EU government process; 
they elect members to the European Parliament, and by electing their national government 
officials, they also elect members of the Council of Ministers who act as a type of executive 
branch. These elected national government officials also appoint the European Commission, 
giving citizens indirect representation over the Commission as well. The citizens can also impact 
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legislative issues through interest groups who can lobby in the system, not unlike the US 
Congress system. The graphic below helps demonstrate the various avenues this social contract 
is practiced in the form of representative governance. 
 
 
Figure 1: Channels of public accountability in the European Union (Norris 274) 
 
 The EU has a system for representing the people, and ways for the people to use freedom 
of speech to influence their government; thus, one would theorize that the social contract would 
be strong in the EU. Unfortunately, many articles have been published stating the opposite, 
saying that a sort of “democratic deficit” exists in the EU today. The democratic deficit theory 
effectively notes that there is a breakdown of democratic representation in the EU. Part of the 
breakdown involves “permissive consent,” wherein there is enough tacit support for EU 
initiatives that the EU officials assume consent, or assume they can manufacture it, thereby 
bypassing much of the representation process (Norris 274). As Norris explains, “the problem of 
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the ‘democratic deficit’ is whether these direct and indirect channels are effective in connecting 
the preferences of citizens to the outcome of EU decision-making. During the early years of the 
Community the technocratic and diplomatic elite determined the direction of European 
development, much as they controlled bodies such as NATO, with the tacit approval of a 
permissive consensus among mass publics. The idea of a ‘permissive consensus’ implies general 
support within public opinion, with passive approval which is widespread if shallowly rooted, 
and which may allow future government action” (Norris 274). This legacy of representation 
paved the way to a sort of government apathy on public opinion, wherein a past of good 
representation has led to a current system where the voices of the people cannot impact the 
governance model clearly and effectively. As a result, there have been declining voter turnout 
rates for members of the European Parliament, as the people feel that their votes do not really 
matter, as the system seems to make decisions without consulting the public (Malkopoulou 2).  
 The implications of the democratic deficit and low voter turnout is that the EU 
governments can afford to focus less on the words of the people in the short-term, because the 
people have less ability to immediately punish the government for not representing their needs as 
demonstrated through free speech. To the average EU voter, it is unclear who the people would 
penalize for passing ACTA; the Council of Ministers appoints the Commission, so should the 
people vote their president or prime minister out of office? Or, should the citizens punish the 
European Parliament members who approved the Council of Ministers’ delegation to the 
Commission? Or, should the citizens blame the European Parliament for passing ACTA, as it 
will eventually have to if ACTA is to become part of European law. As Pippa Norris notes, “The 
lack of transparency about ‘who said what’ in negotiations behind the closed doors of the 
Council of Ministers, and the complexity of relating policy outputs to outcomes, makes it 
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extremely difficult for the public to evaluate the actions of their government within Europe” 
(Norris 273). This lack of clarity of who should “be punished” for ignoring the speech of the 
people means the government members are less afraid that their actions will directly lead to their 
loss of power. Suddenly, the social contract, and the power of an individual’s speech, starts to 
erode.  
 In this case, the EU does manipulate discourse to convince the people of Europe that 
ACTA is in their long-term best interest. However, behind this discourse manipulation, the 
government also realizes that if the people do not support ACTA, the democratic deficit creates a 
safety zone for the government to pass ACTA without fear or public recourse. In essence, the 
people can speak freely, but their words will not translate into government response, thus 
removing much of the power of free speech in the first place. 
ACTA: THE INTERNATIONAL WAR ON PIRACY 
Perhaps the most salient issue in the EU regarding internet governance is the crisis in 
copyright and intellectual property rights infringement. Internationally, copyright infringement 
on the Internet is posing issues to most governments, since governments in countries with 
developed patenting and copyright laws are bound by law to defend those patents and copyrights. 
Of course, even more critical than the issue of the rule of law is the economic need to obtain 
more value added from international trade. Online, it is easy for one user to share music, books, 
or other copyrighted material without paying the businesses that developed said content. This 
form of piracy is robbing a substantial amount of revenue from artists and distributors worldwide. 
Due to the nature of copyright infringement, it is difficult to ascertain precisely how much 
money is lost from Internet file-sharing; after all, the issue is so rampant, and notoriously 
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difficult to track ("Anti-counterfeiting trade agreement," 2012). However, organizations like the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA), and countless distributors and creators of content in Europe are no longer 
willing to tolerant the loss of profits from piracy. From this frustration and this new frontier of 
intellectual property law, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) came into being. 
 This paper will be examining copyright infringement in the EU as a critical aspect of 
internet governance and internet policy for the EU in the 21st century. However, in order to win 
this battle, the EU must reframe the current discourse surrounding ACTA. At present, ACTA is 
seen as a threat to the status quo in the Internet world, where copyrights are still poorly enforced. 
In order to placate a population that fears for its freedom of speech, the EU will need to change 
the tone of the discourse surrounding this agreement if it is to successfully implement ACTA. 
This paper will examine, through discourse analysis, how the discourse surrounding ACTA has 
evolved, and will then show how the EU is taking steps to alter the discourse in the EU 
government’s favor. 
The ACTA case study will focus, through the lens of discourse analysis, on the discourse 
as seen from five perspectives; the ACTA agreement itself, the opinions of the EU government, 
European news media perspectives, the public, as represented by the hacker group Anonymous, 
and international news reporting. Discourse analysis, focusing on manipulations, propagation 
and memes, will reveal that the EU government initially lost the battle to control the discourse on 
ACTA by failing to appropriate proper propagation techniques; however, through the use of 
memes and manipulation, the EU will manage to regain public favor. 
A Brief Overview of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
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 The most recent intervention on intellectual property rights (IPR) infringement in the 
European Union is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). ACTA is frequently 
compared to the US bill, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), but these two documents have 
some substantial differences in both scope and content. While it is true that SOPA and ACTA 
both focus on IPR infringement online, and while both the EU and the US are signatories of 
ACTA, the similarities stop there. SOPA was a bill in the US Congress, designed to be legally 
binding only in the United States. ACTA, meanwhile, is an agreement signed in 2007 by the 
United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea, 
with the European Union, Mexico, and Switzerland committing to signing the agreement “as 
soon as practicable” (Galperin, 2011). On February 11, 2012, the EU formally signed ACTA, and 
pending review by the European Parliament, ACTA will become an agreement to which the EU 
member states are legally bound. 
 In order to properly analyze the discourse on ACTA, it is imperative to establish what the 
ACTA agreement’s text actually says that ACTA will do. Chapter I: Initial Provisions and 
General Definitions describes ACTA’s scope as well as its relationship to past agreements, like 
the TRIPS agreement. The first chapter notes that past obligations from prior agreements stand 
and ACTA will apply only to intellectual property rights existing in the signing countries at the 
time of signature. Individual nations can choose to impose stronger or harsher measures than 
ACTA demands but cannot opt to ignore aspects of ACTA that are part of the treaty.  
Chapter II: Legal Framework For Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights is 
comprised of five sections. Section 1: General Obligations (Article 6: General Obligations with 
Respect to Enforcement) sets out the various obligations and requirements to implement ACTA 
into law in various countries, and to create a fair procedure for following through on ACTA’s 
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provisions. Section 2: Civil Enforcement focuses on the rights holders of IPR, saying that “Each 
Party shall make available to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement 
of any intellectual property right as specified in this Section” and that judges have the ability "to 
issue an order against a party to desist from an infringement" ("Anti-counterfeiting trade 
agreement," 2009). Article 9 states that “In determining the amount of damages for infringement 
of intellectual property rights, a Party’s judicial authorities shall have the authority to consider, 
inter alia, any legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may include lost 
profits, the value of the infringed goods or services measured by the market price, or the 
suggested retail price.” Article 10 specifies that the rights holder may ask to have pirated 
copyright goods and counterfeit trademark goods destroyed. Section 3: Border Measures 
essentially puts in place a system for checking computer files moving between EU and 
international borders at airports. 
Section 4: Criminal Enforcement focuses on the criminal nature of copyright 
infringements in criminal cases, as opposed to civil. Article 23: Criminal Offenses sets forth the 
basic principle that "willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a 
commercial scale" is punishable under criminal law. Article 24: Penalties states that the criminal 
system should "include imprisonment as well as monetary fines" as punishments for IPR 
infringement. Section 5: Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the Digital Environment 
puts forth methods for IPR protection in the digital world as opposed to the physical. In this 
section, the ACTA writers include the statement that digital networks must be managed by the 
signers of ACTA in a way that "preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, 
fair process, and privacy”. This line is clearly meant to assuage the fears of oppression of 
freedom of speech. 
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Chapter III: Enforcement Practices focuses on how ACTA will concretely be enforced by 
the signing countries. This chapter encourages joint actions by the member states, and 
encourages the collection of statistical data to limit infringement. Article 29: Management of 
Risk at Border allows for information from border checks on computers to be shared, saying that 
“Information, including but not limited to information that assists in identifying and targeting 
suspicious shipments, may be shared between parties for the purposes of border enforcement. 
Should an importing party seize infringing goods, it may supply such information to assist an 
exporting party in pursuing infringers”. Chapter IV: International Cooperation focuses on 
information sharing and creating technical assistance mechanisms for the ACTA agreement. 
Chapter V: Institutional Arrangements creates the ACTA committee to enforce the 
ACTA initiatives. In Article 36, the ACTA committee is charged with reviewing “the 
implementation and operation of this Agreement” and deciding “in accordance with paragraph 2 
of Article 43 (Accession), upon the terms of accession to this Agreement of any Member of the 
WTO.” All ACTA committee decisions are done by consensus.  Chapter VI: Final Provisions 
includes some final notes on formalities for the treaty, but have no important policy implications. 
In short, ACTA is designed to create an international focus on piracy of copyrighted 
content, and demand that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet companies avoid piracy, 
with strict repercussions.  
ACTA Discourse in Five Perspectives 
 In order to trace how the EU government has attempted to shape the discourse 
surrounding ACTA, this case study will examine five perspectives: the EU government 
representatives in favor of ACTA, the EU government representatives against it, the citizens’ 
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opinion, the EU media’s perspective, and the international media perspective. In examining these 
perspectives, data such as government publications, news articles, and Twitter posts will be 
considered for their rhetorical implementation of manipulations, memes, and their propagation 
value as determined by the size of the audience observing the commentary. In selection Twitter 
data, only EU citizens with original Twitter posts were considered for examination. No retweets, 
or responses to other Twitter posts, were examined, and no individuals outside the EU were 
considered. 
Looking first at the government perspective, through examining public announcements, it 
is clear that the government for ACTA wished to emphasize protection of freedom of speech in 
its rhetoric from the very beginning. According to European Commissioner Karel De Gucht, the 
commissioner focusing on EU trade and the EU representative most closely associated with 
ACTA’s signing, ACTA was designed to protect freedom of speech, not infringe upon it. De 
Gucht stated on January 1, 2012, that “ACTA does not contain any provisions mandating the 
monitoring of the internet by private companies,” thereby undermining the opposition’s 
manipulation on the discourse of freedom of speech. He also notes that “For instance, it complies 
with the 2009 Telecom Framework Directive which guarantees the protection of the universality 
of the internet in accordance with the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and general principles of EU law and now by the European Union's Charter of 
Fundamental Rights” ("Anti-counterfeiting trade agreement," 2012). By invoking past legal 
frameworks, and therefore invoking the discourse of freedom of speech in law that is considered 
“appropriate” by the EU citizens, de Gucht is grounding ACTA in the discourse of appropriate 
legal steps taken to protect copyrights. Despite this rhetorical attempt to steer the discourse in 
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favor of ACTA, de Gucht was unsuccessful. Despite having been signed by 22 EU nations, 
ACTA has a substantial discourse surrounding it that does not support the agreement.  Currently, 
ACTA has been received poorly by the public, several government representatives, and Internet-
based corporations.  
The EU media has been active in propagating a more negative discourse surrounding 
ACTA, being quick to manipulate the discourse surrounding the votes in favor of ACTA. One 
Economist article from February 11th uses this paragraph to describe the mood surrounding 
ACTA in the EU’s government: 
No sooner was the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) signed than 
Kader Arif, the European Union’s chief negotiator, called it a “masquerade” and 
resigned. Slovenia’s envoy, who signed the deal at a powwow in Japan, called her 
own behaviour an act of “civic carelessness”. Romania’s prime minister (now 
resigned) admitted he couldn’t say why his country had signed it. In Poland, 
where lawmakers protested by wearing Guy Fawkes masks associated with the 
Anonymous hacker-activist collective, the prime minister said he would suspend 
ratification. The Czech Republic and Slovakia (which has not signed it) later did 
the same. ("ACTA up," 2012) 
This ACTA response set forth by the Economist, one of the most-read news publications 
in the world, is founded upon the delegates’ inherent dislike for ACTA. This is an alteration on 
the ACTA discourse first established by de Gucht and the drafters of ACTA. The original 
creators of ACTA preach that this was an agreement that will benefit all nations and support 
copyrights worldwide. Here, the news media within the EU is selling a different story. The first 
manipulation occurs; the Economist article’s language indicates that since the delegates don’t 
support ACTA, the citizens should call this agreement into question. By portraying the 
reluctance of the delegates, instead of just the fact that the agreement was signed, the Economist 
article changes the perspective of the agreement. The discourse on ACTA goes from the 
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agreement being a step in the right direction for copyrights, to being an act of “civic 
carelessness.” 
The Economist was not wrong about there being dissent in the government concerning 
ACTA; not only delegates, but also the Data Protection Supervisor who is charged with 
evaluating privacy online, does not support ACTA in its current form. As the European Data 
Protection Supervisor Mr. Peter Hustinx, charged with “protecting personal data and privacy and 
promoting good practice in the EU institutions and bodies,” ("European Data Protection 
Supervisor," 2012) noted in his official stance on ACTA in July of 2010 that this agreement has 
the ability to impact freedom of speech profoundly:  
Such practices are highly invasive in the individuals’ private sphere. They entail 
the generalised monitoring of Internet users’ activities, including perfectly lawful 
ones. They affect millions of law-abiding Internet users, including many children 
and adolescents. They are carried out by private parties, not by law enforcement 
authorities. Moreover, nowadays, the Internet plays a central role in almost all 
aspects of modern life, thus, the effects of disconnecting Internet access may be 
enormous, cutting individuals off from work, culture, eGovernment applications, 
etc.” ("Opinion of the," 2010) 
Thus the discourse receives another manipulation: the individual responsible for 
evaluating this agreement fears that it has dangerous implications for surveillance of civilians. 
The propagation of this statement is quite large, given that this document is freely accessible on 
the Internet. However, it is not as publicly broadcasted as the Economist piece or the ACTA 
agreement. Also, the memes that this discourse manipulation calls into question are those 
surrounding freedom of speech and privacy, both quite sacred to EU citizens. The EU Data 
Protection Supervisor created the report with the intention of fairly evaluating ACTA; however, 
his evaluation does impact the discourse, in this case, further questioning the effect ACTA could 
have on privacy and free speech in the EU. 
86 
 
Public opinion in Europe has not been in favor of the legislation. The hacker group, 
Anonymous, created a video on YouTube, implementing visual and verbal rhetoric to persuade 
the public to oppose ACTA (Anonymous, 2012).  They use an analogy where, under ACTA, if 
you learned a recipe in a cooking class, but then shared it with your wife, then you would be 
liable to be held accountable for pirating copyrighted material. Anonymous notes that this system 
would require ISPs to constantly check content, or their whole sites could be shut down. Under 
this system, according to Anonymous, “the internet as we know it is on the brink of destruction.” 
Anonymous takes its example to the extreme, proposing that lawsuits will not help content 
creators, because “parts of sentences can be protected” under copyright. Anonymous calls out the 
“content mafia,” namely the RIAA and MPAA, who are restricting freedom of speech for the 
sake of their “obsolete business model.” In the end, Anonymous calls ACTA a massive piece of 
corporate lobbying, and calls on the people of Europe and the world to “Stop the Kraken.” 
International news media sources have not been much kinder to ACTA. Russia Today on 
March 3, 2012, showed that the ACTA response has been overwhelmingly negative. Focused on 
the shutdown of pirated content site RnBXclusive.com by the Serious Organized Crime Agency 
(SOCA), this news piece highlights some of the surveillance and disciplining methods used by 
Britain in the name of ACTA (Russia Today, 2012). When SOCA shut down RnBXclusive.com, 
a website that provided illegally uploaded music for downloading, it did not just removed the site; 
it left a message as a warning, saying “If you have downloaded music using this website you 
may have committed a criminal offence which carries a maximum penalty of up to 10 years 
imprisonment and an unlimited fine under UK law.” As Russia Today notes “ten year offenses” 
are of a serious ilk, for crimes such as “rape, manslaughter, not usually for downloading music 
illegally”. What makes this case truly intriguing is that SOCA is typically involved with larger 
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acts of organized crime and has not been typically associated with copyright infringement. As 
Andrew Pierson of the Howard League for Penal Reform notes “If this is what they are labeling 
serious organized crime…what happened to the Mob, the Mafia? Drug Dealing? As far as I think 
the public are concerned, that crime is still happening on our streets.” SOCA’s explanation for 
the behavior states that the organization on a whole “targets organized criminal enterprises 
profiting from the exploitation of the UK public and legitimate businesses. Much of the music 
offered for download by the rnbxclusive.com website was illegally obtained from artists, leading 
the industry to attribute losses of approximately 15 million pounds per year to the site’s activity.” 
In other words, according to the Guardian of February 17th, SOCA has announced, through both 
its actions and through public statements, that it has moved into a new arena of organized crime; 
that of copyright infringement online (Halliday, 2012). UK citizens are concerned about this new 
direction. As Loz Kaye of the Pirate Party stated in an interview with Russia Today, this change 
in SOCA’s mission means that UK citizens “can be monitored and tracked.” On a more personal 
note, he added, “I’m afraid we are going to see this kind of abuse on an industrial scale if ACTA 
comes to pass.” Perhaps most interestingly, SOCA took down the original threat. By way of 
explanation, Russia Today stated that “Internet campaigners say the message was meant to 
frighten, and in reality severe penalties couldn’t be applied to casual downloaders.” In a tactic 
that is straight out of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, the government gave the appearance of 
set a punishment, a ten year prison sentence, which was meant to encourage self-regulation by 
the public. The furor that resulted showed that the punishment was questioned by the people; 
however, the concern this move generated showed that the government succeeded in sending a 
warning to the public.   
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 The EU citizens on Twitter have closely followed the developments of ACTA. Looking 
at the figure below, a sampling of ten Twitter posts shows the progression of ACTA through the 
EU governance system, and the citizens’ perspective on the discourse. These posts were selected 
for originality of content (no retweets from other users were selected), relevance to the topic area, 
and only EU citizens were included in the sample group. These twitter posts reflect, through 
manipulations, propagation, and memes, a largely negative sentiment surrounding ACTA. 
 
Figure 2: Citizen Twitter Posts Concerning the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
Date Name Comment Text Numbe
r of Re-
tweets 
Number 
of 
Favorite
s 
Link 
to 
Web-
page 
Side of 
Discour
se 
Jan. 
26, 
2012 
Laurent 
Bauvens22 
#ACTA #MustRead "Un 
calendrier accéléré pour faire 
passer l'accord avant que 
l'opinion publique ne soit 
alertée." 
http://www.numerama.com/m
agazine/21424-acta-
demissionnaire-kader-arif-
denonce-une-mascarade.html 
 
-Link reports that MEP Kader 
Arif resigned from ACTA 
rapporteur position 
 
Translation: ACTA # # 
MustRead "An accelerated 
schedule for passing the 
agreement before the public 
is alerted. 
 
0 0 Yes Anti-
ACTA 
Jan 
31, 
2012 
Michael 
Clausen23 
Stop Internet #Censorship! 
Sign the urgent global petition 
@Avaaz urging the EU 
Parliament to reject #ACTA: 
https://secure.avaaz.org/en/e
0 0 Yes Anti-
ACTA 
                                               
22
 https://twitter.com/#!/bauvens/statuses/162581255563657216 
23
 https://twitter.com/#!/michaelclausen/status/164337834130550785 
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u_save_the_internet_spread/
?wjRxIcb 
-links to petition against 
ACTA 
Feb 
2, 
2012 
Louis 
Papaemman
uel24 
Citizens from all over the 
world are signing the Stop 
#ACTA #petition, 1 signatory 
every 2 secs - next goal: 2 
Million  
0 0 Yes Anti-
ACTA 
Feb. 
22, 
2012 
Chris Abela25 Individuals in favour of 
#ACTA, should be free to 
adopt it, others should be free 
to opt out. 
0 0 No Anti-
ACTA 
Mar. 
23, 
2012 
Balthasar 
Glättli26 
@francoiseleste @thonixx 
@CarloSommaruga das 
anonymous video ist nicht 
up2date und schadet der 
seriösen #acta Kritik eher, 
weil übertrieben. 
 
Translation: @ @ 
francoiseleste thonixx @ 
anonymous CarloSommaruga 
the video is not serious and 
detrimental to the up2date # 
acta criticism because it is 
exaggerated. 
0 0 No Non-
specific 
Mar. 
26, 
2012 
Joan 
Roussouliere
27
 
Debat sur #ACTA a Sciences 
Po commence avec 
commission europeenne, 
parti pirate finlandais, 
@laquadrature et PPE. 
 
Translation: Debate on ACTA 
# begins with Sciences Po 
European commission, 
Finnish Pirate Party, and 
laquadrature @ EPP. 
1 0 No Non-
specific 
Mar. 
27, 
2012 
Oliver 
Grimm28 
#ACTA Ausschuss für 
Internationalen Handel im 
#Europaparlament stimmt 
dagegen, den ACTA-Text 
dem Gerichtshof der EU 
vorzulegen. 
 
0 0 No Non-
Specific, 
slightly 
Anti-
ACTA 
                                               
24
 https://twitter.com/#!/louis_gov2u/status/165053994367070208 
25
 https://twitter.com/#!/AbelaChris/status/172258795748200448 
26
 https://twitter.com/#!/bglaettli/status/183247653478481921 
27
 https://twitter.com/#!/jaralive/statuses/184330807488421889 
28
 https://twitter.com/#!/grimmse/status/184631657280704513 
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Translation: # ACTA 
Committee on International 
Trade in the # European 
Parliament votes against the 
ACTA text submitted to the 
Court of the EU. 
April 
2, 
2012 
Ahmed 
Shihab-
Eldin29 
 
#ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement) - the 
worldwide #SOPA could be 
passed within 10 weeks - 
read all about it. 
http://www.akascope.com/20
12/04/02/acta-passed-10-
weeks-action-late/ 
 
3 1 Yes Rhetoric
ally non-
specific, 
implied 
Anti-
ACTA 
April 
4, 
2012 
Felix 
Treguer30 
#ACTA RT @EDRi_org: 40 
days for the European 
Commission to come up with 
22 words 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressR
eleasesAction.do?reference=I
P/12/354&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLangu
age=en 
 
-link to European 
Commission decision to refer 
ACTA to Court of Justice 
-“22 words” refers to this 
question for the Court: "Is the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) 
compatible with the European 
Treaties, in particular with the 
Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European 
Union?" 
1 0 Yes Anti-
SOPA 
April 
5, 
2012 
Frédéric 
Couchet31 
RT @laquadrature EU 
Commission Shamelessly 
Persists In Trying to Delay 
ACTA Vote 
https://www.laquadrature.net/
node/5615  
1 0 Yes Anti-
ACTA 
 
                                               
29
 https://twitter.com/#!/ASE/status/186868600932532224 
30
 https://twitter.com/#!/FelixTreguer/statuses/187573454768320513 
31
 https://twitter.com/#!/fcouchet/status/187836702616846336 
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 The Twitter posts show little diversity in perspective surrounding ACTA; most posts are 
either against ACTA, or are merely stating facts surrounding the development of the agreement 
as it passed through the Commission to the European Parliament to the Court of Justice, where is 
it is being considered at the time this chapter is being written.  
Propagation: 
Notably, the posts receiving more retweets were originally posted in the latter part of 
March and in early April, when the agreement was contentiously offered to the EU Court of 
Justice for consideration instead of being voted down in the European Parliament. Three of the 
Twitter posts were for petitions to stop ACTA; interestingly, none were retweeted, meaning no 
one in the Twitter community wanted to spread the word about the petitions. Retweeting is a 
very literal example of propagation; the more retweets a post has, the more people spread the 
tweet throughout the Twitter community, and the wider an audience the tweet has. The fact that 
these petitions did not receive retweets mean that there were less audience members privy to that 
side of the discourse.  
Manipulation: 
 The best example of manipulation by a citizen in a tweet was by Frédéric Couchet, who 
misrepresented the decision to take ACTA to the Court of Justice. His claim is that the “EU 
Commission Shamelessly Persists In Trying to Delay ACTA Vote,” and cites an article that 
claims the Commission pursued the Court of Justice even after one subcommittee in the 
European Parliament voted against ACTA going to the Court of Justice. If the government 
explanation is valid, then this claim is a manipulation. The government’s explanation, as cited in 
an article in Tayebot’s tweet (See Figure 3), is that this subcommittee voted to not have ACTA 
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go to the Court of Justice because it would be redundant, since the Commission already planned 
to send the agreement to the Court for consideration. This explanation obviously differs 
drastically from the discourse given by Mr. Couchet. Mr. Couchet and the article he cites are not 
wrong, per se; rather, they manipulate the facts to make it sound as though the government is 
delaying the vote. Thus, this is a significant manipulation of the discourse. 
Memes: 
 These Twitter posts by citizens, while engaging with ACTA as it progresses, do not 
engage as much with the memes behind it. One person tweeted to “Stop Internet #Censorship,” 
which hails back to a common meme in the ACTA discourse, that of freedom of speech 
infringement and the sacredness of uninhibited speech. Aside from that comment, most posts 
merely noted updated on ACTA’s progress, or asked other Twitter members to sign petitions 
against ACTA without specifying memetic reasons for rejecting the agreement. This absence of 
memes in the citizen Twitter discourse differs significantly from the government discourse, 
which relies heavily on such memetic rhetorical devices to gain public support. 
 The EU government officials have been very vocal on Twitter concerning ACTA, as 
social media became the discourse battleground for winning public opinion. Below is a data 
sample of eight Twitter postings by government officials in the EU. Through discourse 
propagation, manipulation, and memes, the EU officials portray a positive picture of ACTA’s 
potential influence on the EU’s economic prosperity. While some remain more neutral, none 
outright challenge the validity of ACTA as an agreement. 
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Figure 3: Public Official Twitter Posts 
Date Name Comment Text Numbe
r of Re-
tweets 
Number 
of 
Favorite
s 
Link 
to 
Web
page 
Side of 
Discour
se 
Jan. 
30, 
2012 
Neelie 
Kroes, Vice 
President of 
the 
European 
Commission
32
 
 #ACTA is not #SOPA, ACTA 
does not change EU law. but 
EU law on copyright can 
certainly be improved! 
27 0 No Pro-
ACTA 
Feb. 
23, 
2012 
John Clancy, 
Spokesperso
n for EU 
Trade 
Commission
er Karel De 
Gucht 33 
Commissioner De Gucht on 
#ACTA: "This is not 1984; this 
is 2012. ACTA is not 'Big 
Brother'. It's about solving our 
today's economic problems" 
1 1 No Pro-
ACTA 
Feb. 
29, 
2012 
Daniel 
Caspary, 
Member of 
European 
Parliament34 
ab jetzt Debatte zu #ACTA mit 
Kommissar de Gucht im #EP-
Außenhandelsausschuss 
#INTA #EP 
 
Translation: Starting now, # 
ACTA debate with 
Commissioner de Gucht in the 
# EP Foreign Trade Committee 
INTA # # EP 
0 0 No Non-
specific 
Mar. 
1, 
2012 
European 
Parliament 
Twitter35 
#ACTA workshop at #EP, 
citizens speak now, live 
-link to live debates, now dead 
link 
4 1 Yes Non-
Specific 
Mar. 
5, 
2012 
John Clancy, 
Spokesperso
n for EU 
Trade 
Commission
er Karel De 
Gucht 36 
Don't believe the hype, read the 
actual #ACTA text yourselves  
http://register.consilium.europa.
eu/pdf/en/11/st12/st12196.en11
.pdf 
and in all #EUlanguages 
-Links to the Council of the 
European Commission’s 
version of the ACTA 
8 3 Yes Pro-
ACTA 
Mar. 
7, 
Daniel 
Caspary, 
freue mich auf die Diskussion 
über #ACTA mit @netzpolitik, 
2 0 No Non-
specific 
                                               
32
 https://twitter.com/#!/NeelieKroesEU/statuses/163984611813236739 
33
 https://twitter.com/#!/EUJohnClancy/status/174907741532471297 
34
 https://twitter.com/#!/caspary/status/174907906540584960 
35
 https://twitter.com/#!/Europarl_EN/statuses/175245442689409024 
36
 https://twitter.com/#!/EUJohnClancy/status/176693371534966785 
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2012 Member of 
European 
Parliament37 
@petertauber und @tj_tweets 
um 1600 im Bundestag. #EP 
 
Translation: I look forward to 
discussing with @ # ACTA 
network policy, and @ @ peter 
deaf tj_tweets at 1600 in the 
Bundestag. # EP 
Mar. 
27, 
2012 
Greens in 
the EP, 
Twitter 
account for 
Green Party 
of 
Parliament38 
#ACTA ratification process 
continues as normal so far. 
Watch the debate in the lead 
EP trade committee 
http://bit.ly/H6ScWq #ACTA 
-link to live debates, now dead 
link 
2 0 Yes Pro-
ACTA 
Mar. 
28, 
2012 
“Tayebot”; 
Digital Media 
Co-ordinator 
at European 
Parliament. 
39
 
#ACTA: reasons for committee 
vote against referral to Court of 
Justice 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
news/en/pressroom/content/20
120327IPR41978/html/ACTA-
reasons-for-committee-vote-
against-referral-to-Court-of-
Justice 
0 0 Yes Non-
specific 
 
Propagation: 
 The government tweets received over double the number of retweets of the civilians. This 
propagation difference is not surprising; as noted in Chapter 1, the more power an individual has, 
the better they are able to propagate their message. While power is one explanation for the 
increased propagation, another reason is that these officials are the sole purveyors of what is 
occurring behind closed doors in European Parliament and EU Commission meetings. While 
citizens largely represent their personal opinions on ACTA in their Twitter posts, the EU 
government officials provide updates on ACTA, with some manipulation and memetic devices 
                                                                                                                                                       
37
 https://twitter.com/#!/caspary/status/177373106783002624 
38
 https://twitter.com/#!/GreensEP/statuses/184545278123184128 
39
 https://twitter.com/#!/Tayebot/status/184932363707490304 
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woven into the factual reporting. For this reason, more people on Twitter are likely to repost the 
government tweets, since these tweets offer valuable information not available elsewhere. 
Manipulation: 
 The majority of these Twitter posts focus on the pro-ACTA or non-specified sides of the 
debate. The non-specified tweets did not have significant discourse-related manipulation; they 
typically noted what was occurring as ACTA moved through the EU governance process. The 
observation that debates occurred or that negotiations happened is not a manipulation, as these 
events did occur. However, the pro-ACTA side of the discourse had some manipulations present 
in their rhetoric. Neelie Kroes’s observation that “ACTA is not SOPA” was a manipulation 
designed to distance ACTA from the failing SOPA legislation that, as of January 30th, was 
predicted to not pass in the House of Representatives. At that point, the SOPA blackouts had 
already swayed public opinion on SOPA, and the blackouts reached the attention of an 
international audience. By disassociating SOPA and ACTA, Kroes’s rhetoric manipulated the 
discourse on ACTA to further remove it from SOPA’s negative press. 
Memes: 
 John Clancy’s tweet most directly references the meme of freedom of speech. His 
comment that “ACTA is not ‘Big Brother’” refers to George Orwell’s 1984, a work of literature 
known for a government that limits all personal freedoms, and is known for its surveillance of 
the population’s every move. George Orwell’s government, in fact, is an excellent literary 
example of the panoptic state and a surveillance model taken to an extreme. By invoking the 
language of “Big Brother,” Clancy touches upon this meme, the subconscious reference to this 
classic work of European literature. By noting this meme and then drawing attention instead to 
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“today’s economic problems” redirects the public’s attention from one meme to another, from 
freedom of speech to economic issues. 
 
 
 
Conclusions on the European Union Government’s Next Moves 
 
Through all of this negative press, ACTA was still signed by 22 European Union nations, 
and still made it to the Court of Justice for further judicial consideration. How did this uprising 
of public opinion fail to stop ACTA at any of these points in time? After all, the governments of 
the EU cannot ignore their people indefinitely. In large part, the governments are acting in terms 
of the long-term interest of their people vis a vis the economy. With the economic instability in 
Europe, the governments are looking for some area of economic activity that can be improved. 
Copyrights are one such arena. Moreover, ACTA is still moving forward because the EU has not 
given up on persuading the public that it is the right move for copyrights online. 
First, the EU is firing back with its own web campaign. With actions consisting largely of 
responses from the EU Commissioner for trade during countless interviews, the EU’s 
representatives are fighting back with their own reframing of the discourse. In a response to the 
criticisms launched against ACTA, de Gucht responded after February 22, 2012, to the 
accusations of outside parties. He notes that “ACTA will not censor the internet. It will not 
mandate monitoring of individuals e-mails or blogs. It will not subcontract the functions of the 
police to private internet service providers. It will not restrict the sale of legal generic medicines. 
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It will not mandate the inspection of laptops or MP3 players by customs officials” (de Gucht, 
2012). By going down the list of some of the more serious allegations against the agreement, du 
Gucht is directly counteracting the many manipulations on the ACTA discourse, reversing some 
of the negative effects by naming the issues directly, and by saying turning “not said” rhetoric 
into “said” rhetoric. He also invokes a manipulation of his own, observing that he, personally, is 
“a lawyer by training, a liberal democrat by conviction and a lifelong advocate of human rights 
and individual liberties.” By associating himself with liberal ideology and individual liberties, he 
calls upon memes in the collective psyche that negate the criticism of ACTA, which he supports. 
He also lists his past contributions to acts that are associated with free speech, once again calling 
upon memes that are associated with those opposed to ACTA: “As a fairly young MEP, I was 
one of those contributing to the Spinelli Report, drafting the first tentative catalogue of human 
rights which in 1989 formed the basis of the European Parliament's Declaration of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms. This is the predecessor of the EU's fundamental rights charter which has 
become binding law with the Treaty of Lisbon.” By performing these acts of invoking memes 
and manipulations, de Gucht counteracts some of the discourse manipulation done by the media 
and citizens of the EU. 
The main issue with ACTA is that the citizens of the EU clearly do not support it, yet the 
agreement is proceeding through the EU governance process. True, moving the agreement to the 
Court of Justice can be claimed to be a defensive move on the part of the EU Commission at de 
Gucht’s request, a political maneuver to both give the discourse time to cool and to gain the 
legitimate backing of the Courts that ACTA is in the spirit of EU freedom of speech laws. Yet, 
paradoxically, the real threat to freedom of speech is not from ACTA itself; it is from the EU 
government that continues to ignore the voices of dissent and to reframe the discourse, depriving 
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the people of the ability to alter the government’s plans. In this manner, it is clear that the EU 
saw the dissenters through protests, or through Twitter. After watching in a surveillance model of 
discourse collection, the government then addressed the biggest memetic concerns, those 
pertaining to freedom of speech, through discourse manipulations in government publications 
and government Twitter posts, as well as by seeking the Court’s opinion. In essence, the 
government manipulated the discourse such that ACTA still exists as a potential EU plurilateral 
agreement, ignoring the words spoken in the name of free expression by thousands of European 
citizens. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Regime Types and Internet Governance 
 Freedom of speech, as these cases have shown, is not as simple a concept as the West 
commonly portrays. In America, the term is thrown around carelessly, spoken in a single breath, 
given barely a second thought. In China, the concept of freedom of speech carries an entirely 
different meaning due to disparate political history. In the European Union, the citizens of the 
EU take for granted that they possess complete control over their freedom of speech. This thesis 
shows that freedom of speech is more complex than we perceive it to be. Freedom of speech is 
used in common conversation as a construct, another meme in the discourse of power, as we saw 
in Chapters 3 and 4. More importantly, though, freedom of speech as a governance issue is 
ultimately in the hands of the government to control, to allow or not allow. It is in the best 
interest of the government to control speech as much as they can, and it is in the interest of the 
people to persuade the government to give them as much leeway for speech as possible. 
However, just because the government allows the people to speak, it does not mean that the 
people’s speech is entirely “free” from governmental framing on the discourse. In this way, 
freedom of speech is not entirely “free.” 
The Wenzhou train crash and the SOPA/PIPA and ACTA cases, on the surface, do not 
seem to share many commonalities. Aside from happening within a year of each other, each 
example took place in very different political and economic climates under a totalitarian regime, 
a republic, and a supranational authority. Looking from a bird’s-eye view, these cases seem 
dissimilar. However, when considering the root issue, that of how governments seek to control 
freedom of speech through the Internet, these three issues suddenly become deeply 
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interconnected. At the heart of all three lie governments seeking to gain political control of 
microblogging platforms, pursuing control of discourse in a world where discourses are as 
mercurial as the Internet medium through which they are disseminated. From these cases, the 
manner in which the Chinese and Western governments are interacting with the Internet is 
determined largely by three factors: positive and negative rights, the type of regime the 
government represents, and the need to maintain governmental oversight of discourse.  
 Underlying all of these issues is that the Chinese government prefers to emphasize 
positive rights, while the Western governments prefer to emphasize negative rights. Positive 
rights are defined as what a government can provide its citizens. Food, shelter, and healthcare are 
all examples of positive right. China has a long legacy of prioritizing these kinds of rights. From 
Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong, great Chinese political leaders for thousands of years have felt that 
the ability to provide for ones citizens is central to governance. On the other hand, negative 
rights have not enjoyed the same consideration under Chinese governments. Negative rights are 
loosely defined as those rights which the government is prohibited from infringing upon. 
Freedom of speech is such a negative right, as governments here are prohibited from stopping 
citizens from speaking their mind. Freedom of religion and assembly, freedom from unwarranted 
searches and seizures, these are all negative rights. Looking at the Legalism era in Chinese 
history, continuing through the Maoist crackdowns on political dissent, negative rights have not 
been considered an important aspect of governance. Even in the modern day, the Chinese 
government under Hu Jintao further notes in international conferences and academic and 
political papers that China is focused first on positive rights and secondarily, if at all, on negative 
rights. The implications of this emphasis on positive over negative rights are that the Chinese 
government can infringe on freedom of speech, and then explain to its citizens that the 
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government is doing so in order to provide superior positive rights. The perfect example of this 
dynamic is the Chinese government explanation of its Internet censorship as a function of its 
need to deliver improved economic performance and to stop rioting and violence throughout the 
nation. 
 In the West, both positive and negative rights are considered central to a person’s human 
rights; however, negative rights are heavily emphasized in the West, especially in comparison 
with China. Positive rights are doubtlessly valued in Western culture; the Geneva Convention 
and centuries of political theorists have established that fact. Negative rights are also highly 
valued; the EU treaties and the US Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights, and Constitution 
are all built on the principles of negative and positive rights being integral in the governance 
process. As standards of living increase in Western nations, positive rights have been fulfilled to 
greater levels of citizen satisfaction; thus, the attention in governance has shifted to focus more 
on negative rights.  Today, negative rights in the West are considered central to the Western 
governance process. 
 The government’s theoretical relationship with positive and negative rights impacts its 
practical relationship with censorship, and thus changes how it governs the Internet. As these 
case studies have shown, the Chinese government does not try to hide its censorship, while the 
US and the EU clearly take steps to call their control of speech anything else but censorship. 
More importantly, all their manipulations on the discourse focus on actively monitoring the 
discourse, but they do not have the option of silencing internet conversations through censorship 
unless the safety of the nation can be claimed to be involved. This difference clearly goes back to 
these countries’ relationships with negative rights. The Chinese government does not claim to 
make negative rights a priority; thus, when confronted with examples of Chinese government 
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censorship, the government’s reply is often framed in terms of the positive rights being gained by 
censorship, with more safety and a better quality of life being maintained through the regime’s 
control. In the West, censorship has a negative connotation; the EU and the US government 
cannot simply admit they censor certain material without recourse from its citizens. Typically, as 
can be seen from the Freedom of Information Act’s exceptions, the US government frames 
censorship as occurring only when citizens’ lives are in danger ("US Department of State 
Information Access Guide”). This, too, is an example of the government using positive rights to 
explain a violation of negative rights; however, the scope of excuses the US government can 
make using positive rights is narrower than China, because the US government claims to highly 
value negative rights. As major proponents of freedom of speech around the world, the EU and 
the US governments lose face when they are accused of censorship. 
 Let’s take a step back from the rhetoric surrounding censorship and recognize that the EU, 
the US, and China all engage in active shaping of discourses online. Sometimes, even the EU 
and US government “censor” citizen speech if it is perceived as compromising the safety of the 
nation. Complete freedom of access to all information is not an attainable goal in any 
government; if such a society did exist, that government would have no military secrets, no 
ability to operate with any degree of secrecy. Given that complete information disclosure is not 
the goal, the rational understanding of access to information in the US is that the following 
categories of information must remain secret, while all else is disclosed: 
1) Classified information for national defense or foreign policy; 
2) Internal personnel rules and practices; 
3) Information that is exempt under other laws; 
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4) Trade secrets and confidential business information; 
5) Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters that are protected by legal 
privileges; 
6) Personnel and medical files; 
7) Law enforcement records or information; 
8) Information concerning bank supervision; and 
9) Geological and geophysical information. ("US Department of State Information 
Access Guide”) 
At the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005, both the EU 
and the US affirmed the Declaration of Principles presented. One of the key portions of that 
document is the section which reads as follows: 
We reaffirm, as an essential foundation of the Information Society, and as 
outlined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that 
everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; that this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
Communication is a fundamental social process, a basic human need and the 
foundation of all social organization. It is central to the Information Society. 
Everyone, everywhere should have the opportunity to participate and no one 
should be excluded from the benefits the Information Society offers. 
 
 Thus, both the EU and the US have affirmed the desire to maximize availability to 
information. However, both the EU and the US have engaged in censorship that infringes on 
these rights. For examples of this behavior, see Chapter 3. Thus, the existence of censorship is 
clearly present. 
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 In the cases of the Wenzhou train crash, SOPA, and ACTA, all three look like examples 
of where the governments failed to control the public, at least on the surface. However, in all 
three cases, the government was the victor. Sure, the public has not forgotten the conflict. 
However, the government in all three cases was allowed to pursue its agenda, albeit through 
another avenue of policymaking. In the case of the Wenzhou train crash, fast-speed trains are 
still successfully operating in China because the government was able to convince its citizens 
that safety protocols were initiated post-crash to remedy the situation. To date, no actual changes 
to the high-speed system have been publicly announced, but there are promises that such changes 
are in the works. Whether that is true or not, only time will tell. The rhetorical effect, however, 
has been that the government has placated the media, both national and international, and the 
netizens of China. 
 In the case of SOPA, the legislation never passed. However, the US government is still 
actively pursuing alternatives to SOPA, through CISPA and ACTA. Relative to SOPA, ACTA is 
receiving little to no media attention in the US a mere two months after SOPA was pulled from 
Congress. The American public has been publishing fewer and fewer Twitter and Facebook posts 
relating to ACTA, despite the overlapping issues at stake. In the EU, ACTA is still being actively 
protested by the people. However, the EU has been able to pursue actions under the premises of 
ACTA (see the RnBXclusive.com case in Chapter 4), and ACTA avoided being struck down by 
the European Parliament when de Gucht moved it to the Court of Justice for a ruling. Moreover, 
as Foucault notes, just because the people are complaining does not mean the people are in 
control. Foucault’s examples of the confession society outlined in History of Sexuality makes the 
converse argument: the more we talk about an issue, the more we freely offer our concerns, the 
more information we give the government. The White House petition website, We the People, 
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gives the White House exactly this kind of information, with no need for the government to 
respond through any direct action (See Chapter 3). 
 Moreover, these case studies have also shown that governments use freedom of speech 
more in terms of surveillance than they do as a safety valve. The common misconception about 
the Chinese government’s censorship is that it just silences all dissent of any kind, and only let 
out a tiny bit of dissent as a “safety valve” of sorts. If that was true, what would be expected in 
the case of the Wenzhou train crash is that the government would automatically cut off all 
discourse on the Wenzhou train crash, allowing some discontented posts to leak through, and 
then to remove all evidence of these posts as time progresses. Moreover, the government would 
not necessarily respond to these complaints in any concrete fashion. Instead, what was observed 
in the case of the Wenzhou train crash was that the government allowed for a discourse to 
develop on the train crash, then removed certain kinds of extremely inflammatory posts. Most 
importantly, the government’s ministers responded directly to safety concerns and the desire for 
accountability by creating an investigation team to look into the crash and by firing those in 
management positions surrounding the accident. What this response indicates was that the 
government was actively watching the comments of the people, through the Fifty Cent Party and 
the bureaus designed to watch forum and microblog participation. From this surveillance, the 
government was able to construct a response that was sensitive to citizen concerns, allowing the 
government to take control of the situation. 
 In the case of SOPA and ACTA, the Western governments have formally tied themselves 
to the surveillance model, allowing and encouraging all citizen comments but watching the 
discourse with intense scrutiny. This allowance for freedom of speech also encourages citizens to 
give the US and EU governments every opinion they have concerning SOPA and ACTA. As 
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such, the US Congress was able to deduce quickly that SOPA would cost congressmen and 
women their re-election if they voted to pass it. Thus, since the bill lost support it was removed 
from the floor. The White House government, through We the People, was also able to endorse 
its argument for preventing copyright infringement, and in the meantime, it continues to endorse 
ACTA. 
In the EU, the people are similarly perturbed by ACTA’s potential impact on freedom of 
speech. The governments of the EU have thus far been able to dismiss fears of this sort by saying 
that ACTA will be going up for discussion at the next WTO meeting, thus there will be a 
democratic discussion of its principles before it goes into effect. The decision to move ACTA to 
the Court of Justice was another method of regaining public support before the publically elected 
members of the European Parliament could vote against it. While the EU claims that ACTA is 
not currently impacting EU governance, the fact remains that copyright crackdowns have already 
begun, as seen in the case of RnBxclusive.com which adhered to ACTA’s principles. This sort of 
rhetorical duality is possible because the EU and the US’s surveillance of public opinion through 
the Internet allows for subtle manipulations of the discourse, such that the governments can walk 
the tightrope between upsetting the citizens of the US and upsetting the corporate lobby in 
support of  SOPA and ACTA. 
 The implications of this thesis is that the Internet has become the newest medium through 
which governments must control discourse, and thus freedom of speech, in order to have 
effective governance in every other facet of the government. Across regime type and geographic 
location, this principle of control of discourse aptly describes government relations with the 
Internet. It’s not so simple as censorship and free speech; governments have to control discourses, 
what is and is not said, in order to maintain power. This basic theoretical model was used by 
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Foucault in the 1960s, before the advent of the Internet. After the Internet’s creation, Foucault’s 
panopticon from Discipline and Punish explains this surveillance model of governance in society 
just as well as it did before the Internet’s inception. Now, however, the governments of the world 
are able to use the Internet to penetrate deeper into the daily lives and opinions of their citizens. 
Moreover, as Foucault describes in History of Sexuality, the confessional culture created by 
governments in the 1800s surrounding sex can aptly describe how these government elicit 
commentary from its citizens, in order to respond to claims of poor governance with appropriate 
government measures. These political theories from past eras stand true today. 
Freedom of speech in the modern era is not “under attack,” however. Rather, freedom of 
speech is now and has always been allowed under proviso. This thesis builds on a premise 
forgotten by the West: freedom of speech is an ideal, but not completely attainable. Governments 
will have secrets and will control discourse by virtue of their power, and do so in the pursuit of 
societal and political stability. To have complete freedom of speech would be achievable only 
under political conditions of anarchy. Successful governance relies on balancing the need for 
secrecy and control with the need to allow citizens to achieve self-determination. In every 
country, even China, governance seeks to strike this balance. In the age of the Internet, this is 
still the goal for governance. The only change is the speed at which this governance must occur 
and the mechanisms developed to manage this balance. It is in the rapidly firing synapses of this 
new global network that the future of governance lies, and the speeches and discourse of the 
future will be shaped in this new realm of cyberspace. 
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